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I. INTRODUCTION: WHAT IS MISSING FROM THIS 
PICTURE? 
On March 27, 2014, Iwao Hakamada was released from the 
Tokyo Detention Center’s death row. 1   In 1966, the former 
professional boxer had been arrested and prosecuted for the murder 
of a wealthy executive and his family, as well as the arson and 
robbery of their home.2  Hakamada was convicted in 1968 and his 
                                                                                                               
* Professor, Doshisha University Law School.  The author would like to take the 
opportunity to acknowledge the guidance and encouragement of Professor Setsuo Miyazawa 
over the years, without which this article would probably never have been written. 
 1 Justin McCurry, Japanese Man Freed After 45 Years on Death Row as Court Orders 
Retrial, GUARDIAN (Mar. 27, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/27/
japanese-man-freed-death-row-retrial [https://perma.cc/3RP4-RM9Y]. 
 2 Id. 
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conviction affirmed by Japan’s Supreme Court in 1980.3  He went on 
to become “the world’s longest-serving death row inmate.”4 There 
was just one problem: he was almost certainly innocent. 
Hakamada’s conviction was based primarily on his own 
confession as well as a pair of bloodstained pants the police insisted 
were his despite not fitting.5  His confessions were coerced, based on 
“23 straight days of daily 12-hour interrogations, punctuated by 
threats and beatings” during which he stated he “could do nothing but 
crouch down on the floor trying to keep from defecating.”6 
In court, he recanted and of the forty-five written confessions 
presented as evidence by the prosecution, the bench rejected forty-
four of them as not having been given freely.  Fortuitously (or perhaps, 
“inexplicably”), the single remaining confession was found not to 
have been coerced and formed the principal evidence underlying his 
conviction, even though one of the judges who convicted him secretly 
thought he was innocent and ultimately quit the bench over his failure 
to convince his two colleagues on the three-judge panel.7 
Almost immediately after his conviction was confirmed by 
the Supreme Court, his lawyers moved for a new trial.8  This was 
rejected thirteen years later. 9   An unsuccessful round of appeals 
followed, and the entire process was restarted anew by the filing of a 
second motion for a new trial in 2008.  By 2010, an alliance of Diet 
members was formed to advocate on his behalf.  Hakamada had been 
a cause celebre, symbolizing everything that was wrong with the 
Japanese criminal justice system. 10   According to the U.N. 
Committee on torture, his time on death row would have constituted 
a form of mental torture.11 
                                                                                                               
 3 Id. 
 4 Id. 
 5 Charles Lane, On Death Row in Japan, HOOVER INST. POL’Y REV. (Aug. 1, 2005), 
http://www.hoover.org/research/death-row-japan [https://perma.cc/86A6-NU52]. 
 6 Id. 
 7 Ex-judge Denied Visit to Inmate, JAPAN TIMES (July 3, 2007), http://www.japantimes.
co.jp/news/2007/07/03/national/ex-judge-denied-visit-to-inmate/#.V0_OpWB-PIV [https://
perma.cc/T3EM-3YVK]. 
 8 Lane, supra note 5. 
 9 Id. 
 10 Chisaki Watanabe, On Death Row and a Cause Celebre, JAPAN TIMES (May 9, 2008), 
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2008/05/09/national/on-death-row-and-a-cause-celebre/
#.WQjYOvmzLJA [https://perma.cc/BXY9-Z7XQv].  
 11 U.N. Comm. Against Torture (CAT), Conclusions and Recommendations of the 
Committee Against Torture: Japan, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/JPN/CO/1 (Aug. 3, 2007), 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol12/iss3/3
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Hakamada’s is not an isolated incident.  Enzai or wrongful 
convictions—some for high profile murder cases, others for lesser 
crimes like groping women on trains—are a staple feature in the 
Japanese media.12   The titles of high profile wrongful conviction 
cases are probably more familiar to most Japanese law students than 
the names of the Supreme Court judges. 
There are a number of reasons why enzai cases occur, but a 
key piece of the puzzle is the ability of police and prosecutors to 
detain suspects for prolonged periods with limited access to counsel 
before a charging decision is made.  Other factors, such as limited 
access to exculpatory evidence by the defense, make trials very pro-
prosecution (to say the least), resulting in a justice system that often 
seems to operate at odds with seemingly clear constitutional 
mandates regarding criminal procedure—mandates that on their face 
would seem very familiar to Americans.13 
One thing that does not feature in accounts of enzai, however, 
is habeas corpus.  Japan has had a habeas corpus statute since 1948,14 
one that is conspicuously absent from discourse about enzai, not only 
in the context of the all-too-common accounts of prolonged coercive 
detentions by police, but also subsequent efforts to obtain prompt 
judicial relief when it becomes readily apparent that an innocent 
person has been convicted.  As already noted, it took the Shizuoka 
District Court thirteen years to rule on Hakamada’s motion for a new 
trial.15  Similarly, Toshikazu Sugaya, who served seventeen years in 
prison for the murder of a young child based on a coerced confession 
and DNA evidence, was not freed through habeas corpus 
immediately after more advanced DNA testing confirmed his 
                                                                                                               
http://www.refworld.org/publisher,CAT,,JPN,46cee6ac2,0.html [https://perma.cc/3TS9-
TK93] [hereinafter UNCAT Japan Report]. 
 12 See, e.g., Kazuko Ito, Wrongful Convictions and Recent Criminal Justice Reform in 
Japan, U. CINCINNATI L. REV. 1245 (2012) (discussing recent criminal justice reform in 
Japan and media’s role).  See also SOREDEMO BOKU WA YATTENAI [I JUST DIDN’T DO IT] (Fuji 
TV 2006) (Japan).  The Director Masayuki Suo’s stark depiction of the prolonged detention 
and ultimate conviction of a young man erroneously accused of groping a woman on a train 
was based on an actual case.  See Kenji Hirano, Film on Accused Gropers Reflects Judiciary 
Flaws: Lawyers, JAPAN TIMES (July 11, 2007), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/
2007/07/11/national/film-on-accused-gropers-reflects-judiciary-flaws-lawyers/#.V1qIGG
B-PIU [https://perma.cc/R5W7-K268] (discussing how the film I Just Didn’t Do It reflects 
actual issues with the Japanese judiciary). 
 13 Ito, supra note 12. 
 14 Jin shin hogohō [Habeas Corpus Act], Law No. 199 of 1948 (Japan) [hereinafter 
Habeas Corpus Act]. 
 15 Lane, supra note 5. 
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innocence.  He was freed pending a new trial after the prosecutors 
essentially acknowledged his likely innocence—a subtle, but 
important difference.16  In that case, it also took the court over five 
years to reject his motion for a new trial.17 
II. HABEAS CORPUS AS A BELLWEATHER OF 
COMPARATIVE LAW AND CONSTITUTIONAL DECLINE 
Habeas corpus provides an excellent example of the pitfalls 
of comparative law.  After all, it would be factually correct to say that 
Japan has a habeas corpus statute, the Habeas Corpus Act, which will 
be discussed in greater detail in the pages that follow.  It would also 
be correct to describe this statute as providing for prompt judicial 
relief from unlawful detentions in contravention of constitutional 
principles.  However, both of these technically correct statements 
would be widely misleading as to how habeas corpus is actually used 
in Japan and how one would go about obtaining judicial relief for 
improper detentions in the country.  As this article will show, habeas 
corpus does play a role in the Japanese legal system, albeit an obscure, 
largely unheroic one that is almost completely divorced from its 
original intent and the text used to formulate the remedy it purports 
to offer. 
A case can also be made that the fate of habeas corpus is 
indicative of the direction taken by Japan’s constitution as a whole.  
In the Anglo-American system, habeas corpus is a remedy of 
constitutional, indeed, proto-constitutional significance.  It is the 
“Great Writ” of common law jurisprudence—“the most stringent 
curb the ever legislation imposed on tyranny.”18  As a form of relief 
from arbitrary detention, habeas corpus predates not only the U.S. 
Constitution (where it is one of the scant few “human rights” 
provisions contained in the original charter prior to the addition of the 
Bill of Rights), but also the 1679 Act of Parliament that codified it 
into a more modern form out of the common law primordial ooze.  As 
this Article will show, in Japan it has become something very 
different. 
                                                                                                               
 16 Setsuko Kamiya, High Court OKs Sugaya Retrial, JAPAN TIMES (June 24, 2009), 
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2009/06/24/national/high-court-oks-sugaya-retrial/#.V1
Am_GB-PIV [https://perma.cc/JA5K-Z5GG]. 
 17 Id. 
 18 2 THOMAS MACAULAY, THE HISTORY OF ENGLAND 3 (1848). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol12/iss3/3
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The Japanese constitution is a long, detailed document 
containing some of the Anglo-American constitutional ideals 
reflecting its unusual, partially American provenance.  The direction 
it has taken since its promulgation in 1947, however, is an 
exceptionally complex thing to track, comprised of intertwining 
strands of academic theory, executive branch interpretation, and 
judicial precedents.  As a result, whether its original ideals have been 
given life is a difficult question to answer in general terms, seven 
decades later.  By contrast, habeas corpus represents a single 
constitutional ideal whose arc in post-war Japan can be readily 
tracked as a single strand, independent of the morass of constitutional 
jurisprudence. 
Although the Japanese government has in recent years 
devoted significant resources to translating its laws into English, the 
Jinshin Hogo Hō (Habeas Corpus Act) of 1948 is not one of them.  
The text of the translation promulgated in the English language 
version of the kanpō, the official gazette, is attached to the end of this 
article for reference.19 
III. ORIGINS 
Japan’s previous constitution, the Constitution of the Empire 
of Japan—commonly referred to as the Meiji Constitution—provided 
that “[n]o Japanese subject shall be arrested, detained, tried or 
punished, unless according to law.”20  This allowed for detentions in 
accordance with the law, and there were ample laws and regulations 
on which detentions could be founded.  Writing in January 1946, U.S. 
Army lawyer Lieutenant Colonel Milo Rowell noted that: 
                                                                                                               
 19 Habeas Corpus Act, supra note 14.  Japanese laws and regulations are promulgated 
in the Official Gazette, and until the end of the occupation in 1952, an English version of the 
Official Gazette was also produced.  At the time of writing, access to these records was 
possible through the website of the Legal Information Institute of Nagoya University, at 
http://jalii.law.nagoya-u.ac.jp/project/jagasette [https://perma.cc/7NZE-V9JE].   
The absence of a more recent, error-free translation in the modern database may reflect a 
view that law is simply not important.  In reality, the Act would likely be relevant to non-
Japanese people seeking legal information in English, since two common scenarios for their 
involvement in the Japanese legal system may be (a) detention in immigration facilities and 
(b) child custody disputes, where habeas corpus relief was long used as a mechanism for 
enforcing custody orders.  See discussion infra. 
 20 DAI NIHON TEIKOKU KENPŌ [MEIJI KENPŌ] [MEIJI CONSTITUTION], art. 23 (Japan). 
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All manner of abuses have been practiced by the 
police and procurators in the enforcement of general 
law, but primarily in the enforcement of the thought 
control law.  It is not unusual for people to be 
incarcerated for months and years without charges 
being filed, during all of which time attempts are made 
to force confessions from the accused.  It is strongly 
recommended that Constitutional guarantees be 
required which will prevent imprisonment without 
charges being filed.21 
As we shall see, this American view of the situation in Japan 
is consistent with problems identified by Japanese participants in the 
Diet debates over the Act’s adoption. 
What accounts do exist of the introduction of habeas corpus 
during the American occupation attribute it to a petition by a Japanese 
lawyers’ group, the Zenkoku Bengoshi Hōkoku Kai, to Macarthur’s 
General Headquarters (GHQ) early in the American occupation.22  In 
one of the standard accounts of occupation-era legal reforms, Alfred 
Oppler asserts that habeas corpus was a Japanese initiative, though 
one that the Americans were likely to view amenably: 
This law [the Habeas Corpus Act] implemented the 
constitutional guarantee that no person shall be 
deprived of life or liberty, except according to 
procedure established by law.  Here again, the 
Government Section [i.e., of the Allied occupation 
authorities] was careful not to put pressure on the 
Japanese to adopt something resembling the American 
writ.  The Japanese themselves took the initiative, and 
after thorough preparation in which the judiciary, the 
                                                                                                               
 21 Memorandum from General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for The Allied 
Powers Government Section—Public Administration Branch on Comments on 
Constitutional Revision proposed by Private Group for Chief of Staff (Jan. 11, 1945) 
[hereinafter SCAP Memorandum], http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/shiryo/03/060/060
tx.html [https://perma.cc/SD5F-REUA].  Note that although thought control laws are 
definitely a thing of the past, the prolonged detentions focused on procuring confessions are 
still at the core of problems with the criminal justice system identified by civil libertarians 
and criminal defense lawyers seven decades later. 
 22 Yoshitoshi Mochinobu, Nihonkokukenpō Dai 18 Jō, 34 Jō no Seitei no Ikisatsu [The 
Process of the Drafting Articles 18 and 34 of the Constitution of Japan], 48 KYUSHŪ KŌGYŌ 
DAIGAKU KENKYŪ HŌKOKU 95, 107 (2000). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol12/iss3/3
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executive branch, the legislature, and the bar had a 
hand, while my division was available for advice, a 
Habeas Corpus Act was finally introduced as a 
member bill into the Diet, and was enacted on July 30, 
1948.  General MacArthur was particularly delighted 
with this piece of legislation, since his father had 
introduced a Habeas Corpus Act in the Philippines.23 
Other sources confirm this view.  Before it disbanded, the 
National Patriotic Federation of Lawyers (Zenkoku Bengoshi Hōkoku 
Kai), a lawyers’ association formed during wartime, petitioned GHQ 
and the Japanese government for a habeas corpus-like system of 
judicial relief for deprivations of freedom.24  That said, the Americans 
were also cognizant of the need for “some proceeding which will 
compel the police to bring an arrested person publicly before a court 
and explain the reason for his imprisonment, similar to a writ of 
habeas corpus.”25 
According to the History of the Non-Military Activities of the 
Occupation of Japan, the Habeas Corpus Act was enacted to give 
concrete meaning to article 34 of the new constitution.26  The article 
mandates that: 
No person shall be arrested or detained without being 
at once informed of the charges against him or without 
the immediate privilege of counsel; nor shall he be 
detained without adequate cause; and upon demand of 
any person such cause must be immediately shown in 
open court in his presence and the presence of his 
counsel.27   
The English version of this provision is potentially misleading 
in a way that is relevant to habeas corpus. 28   First, the Japanese 
                                                                                                               
 23 ALFRED C. OPPLER, LEGAL REFORM IN OCCUPIED JAPAN 149 (1976). 
 24 Yoshitoshi, supra note 22, at 106–07. 
 25 SCAP Memorandum, supra note 21 (emphasis added). 
 26 The author has relied on the Japanese translation of these materials, contained in 14 
NAYA HIROMI, GHQ NIHON SENRYŌSHI: HŌSEI, SHIHŌSEIDO NO KAIKAKU 69 (Takemae Eiji 
& Nakamura Takafusa eds., 1996). 
 27 NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 34 (Japan) [hereinafter 
CONSTITUTION] (author translation) (emphasis added). 
 28 It is worth appreciating that the occupation authorities and their Japanese government 
interlocutors were working in parallel across languages and that the goal of the Japanese side 
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version has a full stop following “privilege of counsel.”  In essence, 
it can potentially be read as articulating two separate constitutional 
protections: (1) the right to know the grounds for arrest and detention 
and privilege of counsel and (2) freedom from detention without 
adequate cause, such cause being subject to explanation in open court 
upon demand. 
Second, the Japanese does not say “upon demand of any 
person,” but rather just “upon demand.”  Thus, while the English 
version suggests that the constitution itself provides grounds for any 
person to petition a court for relief for a wrongfully detained person 
(people in such straits typically being unable to do so themselves),29 
the Japanese does not.  In fact, the original GHQ draft of this 
provision limited demands to “the accused or his counsel,” which was 
subsequently revised to “upon demand of any person” in the English 
draft that was then submitted to the Japanese government, the so-
called “MacArthur Draft.”30  In any case, a clear statement that “any 
person” can petition on behalf of a wrongfully detained person was 
set forth in the Habeas Corpus Act.31  As we shall see, though, the 
Supreme Court subsequently used its rule-making authority and 
decisions to render these words largely meaningless. 
Note that some scholars have expressed the view that the 
Habeas Corpus Act was adopted to give life to the Article 18 
protection against involuntary servitude, which in most instances 
would involve detention by non-state actors.32  This appears to reflect 
a widespread initial confusion about the purpose of habeas corpus 
within the Japanese justice system as a whole and its relationship to 
Japan’s Code of Criminal Procedure, which itself underwent 
                                                                                                               
was not necessarily to prepare a scrupulously accurate translation of the English text being 
proffered by the Americans. 
 29 The Japanese language does not require sentences to have a subject.  A more accurate 
translation of the highlighted language would probably be “upon demand, such cause . . .”  
leaving open the possibility of being interpreted to allow demands from any person. 
 30 See Yoshitoshi, supra note 22, at 107–10 (discussing the various iterations of what 
became article 34).  Yoshitoshi also quotes other Japanese scholars expressing the view that 
the “any person” language in the English version is best read as referring to the detained and 
his counsel, rather than anyone in the world at large.  Id. at 115.  The various drafts of the 
constitution prior to the final can be accessed at the National Diet Library’s “Birth of the 
Constitution of Japan” website.  Part 1 Military Defeat and Efforts to Reform the 
Constitution, NATI’L DIET LIBR., http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/shiryo/01shiryo.html 
[https://perma.cc/HSX9-W633]. 
 31 Habeas Corpus Act, supra note 14, art. 2(2). 
 32 Yoshitoshi, supra note 22, at 97–105. 
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extensive restructuring under the American occupation to make it 
consistent with the constitution and provide for procedural 
protections, such as the privilege of counsel and the right of the 
accused to know the nature of the charges against him.33  Certainly, 
the possibility of habeas corpus being used to remedy deprivations of 
freedom by non-state actors—employers, mental hospitals and even 
parents feuding over children—was anticipated as one possible use 
for habeas corpus, though as we shall see most of the debate focused 
on its more obvious constitutional dimensions in cases of wrongful 
detentions by state actors.34 
IV. “LIKE LOOKING FOR FISH IN A TREE”—THE DIET 
DEBATES HABEAS CORPUS 
The bill that became the Habeas Corpus Act was first 
presented for consideration to the Judicial Committee of the House 
of Councillors on February 20, 1948, with the corresponding 
committee of the House of Representatives commencing hearings on 
the same bill the following month.  Over the next three months, a 
series of deliberations were held in both committees, which heard 
testimony from legal scholars, lawyers and other commentators.  
After some amendments by the House of Councilors, the bill was 
ultimately passed by both chambers and promulgated on July 30, 
1948. 
Although this Article can only touch on them briefly, the 
debates over the Habeas Corpus Act offer some fascinating insights 
into how at least a segment of the Japanese intelligentsia viewed the 
recent history of their nation’s legal system.  A portion of the 
legislative history is unsurprisingly devoted to the principles behind 
this strange new law, as well as its history in the Anglo-American 
system. 
Some of those who participated were skeptical.  For example, 
on March 23, 1947, a speaker by the name of Ichirō Kobayashi 
offered the following explanation of the need for the Act, not only 
based on the limits of the previous constitutional system, but the 
                                                                                                               
 33 OPPLER, supra note 23, at 136–49. 
 34 When first introduced to the Diet, the law was described as applying to all 
deprivations of liberty, whether in connection with criminal cases or not, and whether by 
state actors or private actors.  SANGIIN SHIHŌ IINKAI KAIGIROKU DAI 4 GŌ [HOUSE OF 
COUNCILORS JUDICIAL COMMITTEE MEETING MINUTES NO. 4], at 1 (Feb. 20, 1948) (Japan). 
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possible limits of the new one as well.  Those familiar with the state 
of the Japanese criminal justice seven decades later may find them 
oddly familiar. 
As everyone knows, the freedom and personal 
liberties of the people enjoyed fine protection under 
the Meiji Constitution too.  Constitutionally, Japanese 
subjects could not be arrested, detained, questioned or 
punished except in accordance with the law.  
Moreover, the laws guaranteed the freedoms of the 
people, the subjects, with all manner of provisions.  So 
why are there so many accounts of human rights 
abuses?  For example, there is voluntary going to the 
police station or accompanying an office there, which 
becomes “stay the night” then “stay tomorrow night,” 
resulting in a loss of freedom through the police.35  Or 
using the Administrative Enforcement Act.  Or the 
Police Punishment Regulation.36  Or even though the 
suspect has an address, using “lack of address” as 
grounds for detention. 37   Or putting people in 
“protective” custody without reason.38  These are the 
                                                                                                               
 35 Nin’i dōkō or “voluntary accompaniment” remains a common practice in Japan, one 
that can lead to coercive deprivations of freedom that lead in confessions before an arrest 
warrant is even detained.  An example of how endemic the practice has become is illustrated 
by a June 25, 2012 news story about a man who “voluntarily” accompanied a constable to a 
police box after being accused of touching a woman’s thigh on a train.  He then got up to 
use the bathroom but was able to “escape” through the unlocked back door of the police box. 
Chikan Yōgi no Otoko, Nin’i Dōkō no Kōban Uraguchi kara Tōsō [Man Charged with 
Molesting Voluntarily Turned Himself in, Then Escaped from Police Station Through Rear 
Entrance], YOMIURI SHIMBUN (June 25, 2012), http://policestory.cocolog-nifty.com/
blog/2012/06/post-720a.html [https://perma.cc/VU5R-TQ9T].  This incident was reported 
as a comical example of police incompetence that allowed a “criminal” to escape, but of 
course “voluntary accompaniment” meant that the man should have been free to leave at any 
time anyways. 
 36 The Police Punishment Regulations dated back to the pre-war era and empowered 
the police to both define a wide range of behaviors as minor crimes and try and mete out 
punishments for violations, providing a pretext to arrest people in a wide range of 
circumstances.  The regulations were abolished under the occupation, but replaced by the 
Minor Offenses Act, which was considered at the same time as the Habeas Corpus Act, and 
informed some of the debate. 
 37 Lack of an address remains grounds for a court to detain a suspect or deny bail.  KEIJI 
SOSHŌ HŌ [KEISOHŌ] [C. CRIM. PRO.] 1948, art. 58, 60, 89. 
 38 Under the Police Duties Execution Act, police officers are still able to use protective 
custody as grounds for detaining persons outside the scope of the arrest/detention regime 
provided for in the Code of Civil Procedure and the Constitution, such custody being 
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common tools of police and investigating authorities 
and everyone knows it.  Just calling them human 
rights abuses doesn’t accomplish anything.  Why is 
that? Because even though the constitution guaranteed 
the freedoms of the people—the subject—there was a 
lack of means of enforcing that guarantee.39 
On the merits of the Act, Kobayashi notes that 
From now on, Ministers of State or anyone else who 
dares to hide behind the Emperor’s sleeves in their 
illegal conduct will not be able to.  They won’t be able 
to say “I am detaining this person on the order of the 
Emperor, because it won’t be an excuse under the 
Habeas Corpus Act.  So you see, as should be 
abundantly clear from this point, an order under the 
Habeas Corpus Act will be binding on all high 
officials, all bureaucrats regardless of their rank.  They 
must all obey it.  Moreover, such an order may 
sometimes be made in opposition to someone who is 
extremely powerful at the time.40 
A recurring theme in the Diet debates was whether Habeas 
Corpus proceedings were criminal or civil in nature.  The entire 
Japanese Code of Criminal Procedure was being amended at the same 
time for reasons similar to those underlying the adoption of Habeas 
Corpus, in order to eliminate the type of abuses that had occurred in 
the past and making the criminal process consistent with the new 
constitution.  Thus, a sense of confusion seems to prevail amongst 
many of the speakers about how habeas corpus will fit into the overall 
context of arrest and detention provided for in the new Code, a system 
                                                                                                               
justified because, “on the basis of unusual behavior and other surrounding circumstances, 
and moreover [the police officer] has reasonable grounds to believe that such person needs 
emergency aid and protection.”  Keisatsukan Shokumu Shikkō-hō [Police Duties Execution 
Act], Law No. 136 of 1948, art. 3 (Japan).  To the author’s knowledge, protective custody 
does not feature significantly in stories of abusive police practices leading to enzai cases, 
though those who experience it are likely to end up in the same police jail as someone who 
is arrested. 
 39 SANGIIN SHIHŌ IINKAI KAIGIROKU DAI 5 GŌ [HOUSE OF COUNCILORS JUDICIAL 
COMMITTEE MEETING MINUTES NO. 5], at 9 (Mar. 23, 1948).  Unless otherwise noted, all 
translations are by the author. 
 40 Id. at 10. 
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that constitutionally requires a warrant except in cases of crimes in 
process.41  One of the greatest obstacles to habeas corpus achieving 
any meaningful presence in the Japanese legal system may be 
attributable to the fact that the judiciary as a whole was (and is) 
complicit in many of the pre-trial deprivations of freedom that did 
(and do) take place through the issuance of detention warrants.42  This 
was acknowledged by some of the participants in the Diet debates.43 
Could it be expected that the same court that issued a 
detention warrant would seriously entertain a writ of habeas corpus 
by or on behalf of the detainee?  Various commentators advocated 
having habeas corpus petitions be made directly to High Courts, 
perhaps even the Supreme Court.  This latter suggestion was rejected 
due to the expense and inconvenience that would be involved in 
seeking a writ on behalf of someone detained in an isolated part of 
the country, such as Hokkaido.44  
The uncertainty about whether it was a civil remedy or part of 
the criminal process also provided grounds for complaints about the 
                                                                                                               
 41 CONSTITUTION, supra note 27, art. 33. 
 42 It is beyond the scope of this paper to get into the details of Japanese criminal 
procedure.  However, it should be noted that Japan does not have a system of arraignment 
following arrest.  What it has instead is a set of deadlines by which police or prosecutors 
must either release a suspect, bring charges, or apply to a judge for a warrant to detain the 
suspect for up to ten days.  The warrant can be detained for an additional ten days.  As a 
result, a suspect can be held for up to twenty-three days with limited access to counsel before 
a charging decision is made.  Under this system, the suspect will be taken before a judge 
shortly before arrest, but the reason is not to confirm the charges against him, but to examine 
the prosecutor’s reasons for seeking detention.  Under article 60 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure, the common reasons for seeking detention are “flight risk” and “risk of evidence 
tampering,” both of which are based on a presumption of guilt.  KEIJI SOSHŌ HŌ [C. CRIM. 
PRO.] Law No. 131 of 1948, art. 60.  Once the detention warrant is issued, the police and 
prosecutors have ample time to investigate the suspect under highly coercive conditions. 
Note that for detention purposes, even an acquittal by a trial court is not adequate to rebut 
the presumption of guilt, since appellate courts can and do order continued detention pending 
prosecutorial appeals! There is a procedure for seeking an explanation of the reasons for 
detention (C. CRIM. PRO., art. 82) but it is rarely used, possibly because there may be little 
merit for many petitioners to simply have the reason for a detention already authorized by 
the court explained in open court.  That the procedure is intended to be a formality is 
suggested by practice rules that allow petitioners only ten minutes to voice opinions to the 
court. KEIJI SOSHŌ KISOKU [CRIM. TRIAL RULES], Sup. Ct. Rule No. 32 of 1948, art. 85-3(1).   
 43 See, e.g., HOUSE OF COUNCILORS JUDICIAL COMMITTEE MEETING MINUTES NO. 5, 
supra note 39, at 7, 8, 11 (describing some participants acknowledging the complicity of the 
judiciary in pre-trial deprivation of freedom). 
 44 SANGIIN SHIHŌ IINKAI KAIGIROKU DAI 16 GŌ [HOUSE OF COUNCILORS JUDICIAL 
COMMITTEE MEETING MINUTES NO. 16], at 10 (Apr. 26, 1947) (Japan).  As a compromise, 
the Habeas Corpus Act allows for petitions to be filed at either the District or High Court. 
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law on the part who saw the “civil procedure”-like structuring of the 
process, with petitioner and detainer being treated equally; the 
petitioner being burdened with proving that the detention was 
“without legal procedure”45 and detainers having a right of appeal.  
Would any detention that satisfied the requirements of the code of 
criminal procedure (i.e., with legal procedure) survive a petition, even 
if there were no “adequate grounds” as required by article 34 of the 
Constitution?46 
In the context of other procedural protections, both those built 
into the criminal procedural regime and the ability to sue the state (or 
a private actor) in tort for wrongful deprivations of liberty, it was 
recognized that money alone was often not an adequate remedy and 
habeas corpus provided a potentially important source of relief for the 
actual deprivation of liberty. 47   Nonetheless, there was a certain 
amount of puzzlement as to how many cases involving detention by 
police or prosecutors pursuant to the Code of Criminal Procedure 
would result in actual relief.  Participants in the debate were, of course, 
cognizant that habeas corpus would also offer a remedy for 
deprivations of liberty by non-state actors—workers being held in 
slave-like conditions, children, people being held in mental hospitals, 
and so forth.  Yet the great majority of comment on the law was 
clearly focused on detentions by state actors, with numerous 
references to abuses that took place in the past. 
Others expressed concern about the discretion to be granted 
to the Supreme Court to use its new constitutional rule-making 
authority to fill in the gaps in implementing the Act.  In this context, 
the distrust of the judiciary and the procurators expressed by some of 
the commentators is illustrative.  For example, in the following month, 
Waseda University Professor Muneo Nakamura noted to the same 
committee that while America had a unitary legal profession and a 
judiciary that was supported by the people: 
Japan’s courts are divided between the outsider and 
insider legal professions, and judges in the courts do 
not have the backing of the people.  They are a 
bureaucratic institution.  This bureaucratic institution 
needs to be broken down.  What is necessary—taking 
                                                                                                               
 45 Habeas Corpus Act, supra note 14, art. 2. 
 46 CONSTITUTION, supra note 27, art. 34. 
 47 SANGIIN SHIHŌ IINKAI KAIGIROKU DAI 16 GŌ, supra note 44, at 9. 
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for example the Habeas Corpus Act—even if you 
establish the Habeas Corpus Act, I must confess that I 
have suspicions about whether it will immediately 
start to function in a way that protects the people.  That 
is to say, I believe that a system such as this is 
necessary, but the Habeas Corpus Act must be 
established on the assumption that the courts cannot 
be trusted.48 
Later on, he complains, 
I do not think the drafters of this bill have common 
sense.  Perhaps it is unconscious, but it seems like it 
was drafted with the usual professional legal 
bureaucrat’s idea of limiting the avenues for relief as 
much as possible.  This is the tradition for the 
bureaucratic legal professions, to take the unusual 
situation, the so-called exceptional case, the unfair 
situation and use that as an excuse to limit everything.  
For example, if there is a lawyer who acts slightly 
inappropriately, they turn that into greater control over 
all lawyers . . . .They take occasional problems and 
turn them into generally-applicable restrictions, and 
these restrictions result in the courts having greater 
discretionary powers.  I think that adding such 
provisions has been the way legislation relating to the 
judiciary has been drafted in Japan until now.  I think 
this has also manifested itself in the Habeas Corpus 
Act.  But this is a revolutionary new procedure, so it 
should be allowed to impose on the courts a bit.  There 
may be a few petitions that seem unreasonable.  Even 
if the door is slightly open to such things initially, 
causing some burden, isn’t it necessary to think of the 
appropriate method for dealing with such people?  But 
it seems like this bill has been drafted so that it will be 
rendered impotent.49 
                                                                                                               
 48 SHŪGIIN SHIHŌ IINKAI KAIGIROKU DAI 16 GŌ [HOUSE OF COUNCILORS JUDICIAL 
COMMITTEE MEETING MINUTES NO. 16], at 11–12 (April 26, 1948) (Japan). 
 49 Id. 
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Perhaps the most scathing criticism of the judiciary and the 
ability to expect anything of it from habeas corpus came the following 
month from Hiroshi Masaki, a lawyer, who complained of the wide 
discretion being given to judges in evaluating evidence: 
[T]oday, judges who during wartime were the tools of 
Tōjo and blithely followed the National Mobilization 
Act and proudly and triumphantly crushed the anti-
war sentiment of the people, wiping out all anti-war 
activities of the people; these same people who are 
still around . . . expecting such a judiciary to 
administer human rights under the new constitution is 
like looking for fish in a tree . . . . 
Even though under the old constitution the concept of 
judicial discretion rejected all outside freedoms, 
judges have been given the freedom to consider 
evidence even if it involves ignoring logic.  If such 
freedom is again given to judges it will mean the loss 
of the people’s freedom, so in response to their 
freedom to evaluate evidence, we need a provision 
that says that they must follow logic and respect 
reason.  Otherwise there will be a huge gap through 
which the rats can escape, and something fine like [the 
habeas corpus law} will end up being an empty 
treasure . . . .[I]f we stop allowing judges to convict 
based solely on confessions, we would have to assume 
that that judges have the ability to be strictly scientific 
and rational.  If judges lack the ability to judge 
scientifically and their logic is fuzzy, it will be like 
giving calculus problems to elementary school 
students . . . .When judges encounter even slightly 
difficult situations they just say “the evidence is 
inadequate” or “there is no evidence.”  Even if it is 
thousands of pages, a court can look at the entire trial 
record and say there is no evidence.  But it’s not that 
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there is no evidence, it’s that they lack the ability to 
make judgments.50 
Concerns about whether the judiciary could actually make 
habeas corpus work the way it was intended were also expressed 
through a suggestion that appeals from rejected petitions should be 
heard by a panel that includes lawyers, not just professional judges, 
an interesting idea that of course went nowhere.51  A concern that did 
prove prescient was that habeas corpus would end up focused on 
formalities rather than substance, meaning that if a detention ordered 
was validly issued even though the grounds for doing so were 
unwarranted (e.g., the police asserting a suspect to be a flight risk 
when he really isn’t), the remedy would not be available.52 
On the other side, a recurring theme was concern that the 
remedy would be abused,53 a concern that is clearly reflected in the 
structure of the Act (including the authority given to courts in articles 
7 and 11 to dismiss a petition if it lacks substantiation or the court 
determines it to be groundless based on the petition alone54) and, as 
we shall see, the Supreme Court’s implementing regulations.  While 
some of these concerns seem directed at judicial economy and 
harmonizing the new habeas corpus regime with the criminal trial 
process, a different concern about possible abuses was expressed in 
the context of the law’s apparent empowering of any person to 
petition for relief on behalf of another detained person.  For example, 
would this mean that a prostitute who had freely entered indentured 
servitude could be released from her debt by a husband or parent 
petitioning for habeas corpus relief against her own desires?  This 
concern was expressed by more than one commentator, and another 
finally pointed out that such business arrangements would now likely 
be void.55 
Ultimately the Act was promulgated on July 30, 1947.  Like 
the Japanese Constitution, the Habeas Corpus Act has never been 
                                                                                                               
 50 Id. at 16. 
 51 Id. at 12–13. 
 52 SHŪGIIN SHIHŌ IINKAI KAIGIROKU DAI 30 GŌ [HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES JUDICIAL 
COMMITTEE MEETING MINUTES NO. 30], at 6 (Jun. 12, 1948) (Japan). 
 53 SHŪGIIN SHIHŌ IINKAI KAIGIROKU DAI 46 GŌ [2D HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
JUDICIAL COMMITTEE MEETING MINUTES NO. 46], at 8 (Jun. 30, 1948) (Japan). 
 54 Habeas Corpus Act, supra note 19, art. 7, 11. 
 55 SHŪGIIN SHIHŌ IINKAI KAIGIROKU DAI 31 GŌ [2D HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
JUDICIAL COMMITTEE MEETING MINUTES NO. 31], at 1, 3 (Jun. 14, 1948) (Japan). 
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amended in its seven decades of existence.  Instead, drastic 
amendments were wrought to the Act by the Supreme Court through 
its rule making powers and precedents, amendments that effectively 
divorced the law from its original purpose as a remedy for human 
rights violations.56 
V. THE SUPREME COURT TAKES CHARGE 
At the same time the Act took effect, the newly-established 
Supreme Court used its rule-making powers under the new 
Constitution to establish detailed regulations for the handling of 
habeas corpus cases.57  For convenience, these are referred to in this 
article as the Rules.  These, too, were promulgated in English but are 
not available through the Japanese government’s Japanese Laws in 
Translation database.  Accordingly, relevant extracts of the English 
as promulgated have been included as Appendix 2. 
The Rules show not a “conservative” Supreme Court being 
unduly conservative solicitous of the Diet, as has become the widely 
accepted characterization of the court today.58  Rather, they show an 
institution using its rule-making authority to ostensibly fill in the 
details of a statute designed to implement “the principles of the 
Japanese Constitution which guarantees the fundamental human 
rights” while substantively rewriting it in a manner that makes it less 
effective for doing so.59  While the Diet debates showed concern that 
the text of the Habeas Corpus Act alone contained the seeds of an 
implementation regime that courts could use to render it meaningless, 
the Rules effectively ensured richly fertilized in which they could 
grow. 
                                                                                                               
 56 In recent years, a common conservative talking point on the need for constitutional 
amendment has involved simplistic comparisons to the number of times other “peer nations” 
(the United States, France, Germany, etc.) have amended their constitutions since the 
Japanese Constitution was promulgated, the logic apparently being that it is somehow 
“abnormal” that Japan’s charter has remained unchanged over this same period. The 
possibility that the constitution—like the Habeas Corpus Act does not actually mean as much 
as positive law as its text suggests is rarely contemplated. 
 57 Jinshinhogo Kisoku [Habeas Corpus Rules], Sup. Ct. Rule No. 22 of 1948 
[hereinafter Rules].  Article 76 of the Constitution newly created the Supreme Court at the 
top of a judiciary vested with “the whole judicial power.”  CONSTITUTION, supra note 27, art. 
76.  Article 77 vests in the Supreme Court “rule-making power under which it determines 
the rules of procedure and of practice.”  CONSTITUTION, supra note 27, art. 77. 
 58 See, e.g., David Law, The Anatomy of a Conservative Court: Judicial Review in 
Japan, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1545 (2009). 
 59 Habeas Corpus Act, supra note 14, art. 1; Rules, supra note 57, art. 1. 
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What proved to be two of the most substantive changes were 
wrought through article 4 of the Rules.  First, article 4 effectively 
excised the “rapid” and “easy” relief promised by article 1 of the 
Habeas Corpus Act. 60  This was accomplished by empowering courts 
to reject petitioners if there are “any other adequate means whereby 
relief may be obtained” unless “it is evident that relief cannot be 
obtained within reasonable time.”  Needless to say, “adequate” does 
not necessarily require “ease,” and a “reasonable time” suggests 
something far less urgent than “rapid;” distinctions that have been 
borne out by practice. 
More significantly still, article 4 of the Rules addressed the 
fear of habeas corpus abuse by allowing courts to reject petitions 
where the unlawfulness of their deprivation was not “conspicuous.”61  
In other words, a deprivation of freedom that was merely of suspect 
legality, or only “slightly” unlawful would not be amenable to relief.  
This subtle change proved to be of huge importance because it meant 
courts could and did prevent the use of habeas corpus to challenge the 
substantive legality (or constitutionality) of various forms of 
detention.  As we shall see, the “conspicuously unlawful” threshold 
soon became a significant barrier to most petitioners seeking relief 
from wrongful detention, even when it technically was wrongful.  No 
“fruit-of-the-poison-tree”-like doctrine would develop in habeas 
corpus as a means of chastening police or other detaining authorities 
for sloppiness.  In fact, as this Article will attempt to show, the 
application of the “conspicuously unlawful” threshold would result 
in the procedures mandated by the Habeas Corpus Act, and thus the 
Act itself, becoming for the most part substantively meaningless. 
The Rules were also used to “solve” the problem created by 
the inclusion in article 2(2) of the Habeas Corpus Act allowing “any 
person” to file a petition on behalf of the detainee. 62   This was 
accomplished by the adoption of the rather fanciful assumption that 
persons deprived of their physical freedom are still able to exercise 
and express free will: article 5 of the Rules outright prohibits 
applications “made against the freely expressed intention of the 
prisoner.”63  A similar assumption about the free will of the unlawful 
underlies the addition in article 35 of the Rules of an option for 
                                                                                                               
 60 Rules, supra note 57, art. 4; Habeas Corpus Act, supra note 14, art. 1. 
 61 Rules, supra note 57, art. 4. 
 62 Habeas Corpus Act, supra note 14, art. 2(2). 
 63 Rules, supra note 57, art. 5.  
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petitioners to withdraw their petitions prior to the court rendering 
judgment (even over the objection of the detaining party).64 
A more subtle change was the expansion of actions a court 
could take with respect to qualifying petitions.  Articles 10 and 16(3) 
of the Habeas Corpus Act gave a court hearing a petition to order the 
release of a prisoner either provisionally or, if the petition had 
grounds, permanently. 65   That was, after all, the basic concept 
underlying the whole statute.  However, article 2 expanded the range 
of relief a court could order “other dispositions which the court 
considers suitable on behalf of the prisoner.”66  In other words, courts 
could find a detention conspicuously unlawful but still refrain from 
setting them “free,” a flexibility which proved useful when using 
habeas corpus to address “detentions” of infant children by parents in 
domestic disputes. 
The Rules also enabled the courts to transform habeas corpus 
in Japan from a process focused on the actual hearing and oral 
testimony, as most common law practitioners would expect, to the 
document-focused proceedings which prevail in Japan.  Article 8 of 
the Rules requires petitioners to include more information and 
substantiation than is required in the law itself, and article 9 
empowers courts to reject petitions which fail to satisfy these 
requirements.67  Essentially, the Rules placed the burden of proving 
that their detentions were conspicuously unlawful squarely on 
petitioners, essentially establishing an evidentiary presumption in 
favor of deprivations of liberty. 
And while the Habeas Corpus Act envisioned a civil trial-like 
exchange of pleadings by detaining party and detainee, the Rules 
similarly expand on what a detaining party must include in the answer, 
including the oddly permissive “reasons why the detainee may not be 
brought to court.”68   In the event a hearing is held, the Rules also 
                                                                                                               
 64 Rules, supra note 57, art. 35.  At least one lawyer involved in operating committee 
discussions about the rules suggested that this rule represented a change of law that would 
result in petitioners withdrawing petitions under coercion.  SUPREME COURT SECRETARIAT, 
TŌKYŌ CHIHŌ SAIBANSHO SHUSAI JINSHINHOGOHŌ UN’YŌ KYŌGI KAIGI SOKKIROKU 
[TRANSCRIPT OF MINUTES OF HABEAS CORPUS ACT OPERATING COMMITTEE MEETING], at 63 
(Oct. 19, 1948) (Japan) [hereinafter OPERATING COMMITTEE MINUTES].  “The law didn’t just 
forget to provide for this.” Id. at 64. 
 65 Habeas Corpus Act, supra note 14, art. 10, 16(3). 
 66 Habeas Corpus Act, supra note 14, art. 2. 
 67 Rules, supra note 57, art. 8, 9. 
 68 Rules, supra note 57, art. 27. 
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have the detaining party explain the substance of his answer first, 
before the petitioner explains the petition.69 
Finally, article 46 of the Rules removes any doubt as to the 
type of procedure habeas corpus was, by declaring that gap-filling 
would be in accordance with the Code of Civil Procedure.70  This 
proved useful in rejecting appeals from the court’s interpretation and 
application of the habeas corpus regime. 
VI. THE STAKEHOLDERS MEET 
On October 19, 1948, shortly after the dust of the law- and 
rule-making processes had settled, under the auspices of the Tokyo 
District Court and the Civil Division of the Supreme Court, an 
extraordinary gathering of representatives of the bar, Ministry of 
Justice, the police, correctional facilities, prosecutors, and about two 
dozen judges (but, interestingly, not a single law professor) met to 
discuss what habeas corpus would actually mean in practice.  The 
minutes of these meetings show the starting position of the people 
who would actually give life (or pseudo-life, at least) to the words of 
the Habeas Corpus Act and the Rules. 
The introductory remarks of the chief judge of the Tokyo 
District Court are worth quoting at length as they may be indicative 
of the attitude of the mainstream judiciary about not only habeas 
corpus itself, but perhaps the constitution as well: 
This law was enacted based on the premise that in 
order to establish democracy, personal freedom must 
be guaranteed as a fundamental right.  In that light, I 
believe it is necessary for us to realize that in 
administering this law the courts are given a very 
heavy responsibility.  I feel it is truly ironic that courts 
have been given this heavy responsibility of protecting 
personal liberty.  Since before this we have performed 
our duties taking due consideration for personal 
freedom, apparently some people go to the extent of 
criticizing the courts as the true villain in trampling on 
human rights.  I believe such criticism is unfair, but I 
also feel it is ironic that now courts are supposed to be 
                                                                                                               
 69 Rules, supra note 57, art. 29. 
 70 Rules, supra note 57, art. 46. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol12/iss3/3
2017] FROM GREAT WRIT TO TUNING FORK 427 
the heroes in protecting personal liberty.  I used to 
think that in the past free courts had done their jobs in 
respecting personal freedom, but recently I feel that 
this view was perhaps a bit naïve.71 
He also offers fascinating insights into the perception gap 
between American occupation authorities and their Japanese 
counterparts regarding the significance of habeas corpus. 
The newspapers reported that General MacArthur 
regarded the passage of this law as an extraordinary 
accomplishment of the Diet.  Yet the papers at the time 
merely repeated the announcement as it was made.  
There was not a single article newspaper article 
reporting on the passage of this law.  At the time I just 
happened to be at GHQ meeting with some of them, 
and I was asked what sort of coverage the passage of 
the Habeas Corpus Act was getting in the press, and 
when I told them that the papers weren’t reporting 
anything their expressions showed surprise.  Seeing 
this, I realized that Anglo-Saxons are deeply 
interested in habeas corpus, which made me feel that 
our own believe that personal freedom was already 
fully protected was highly naïve.  We must change our 
prior attitudes in implementing the law. 
Previously the political and legal system and other 
factors made it so that the primary responsibility of the 
courts was to keep the peace and, during the war, 
keeping the peace became the only responsibility of 
the courts, so that even if we did think about protecting 
personal liberty there it difficult to do anything about 
it.72 
Other judges who had participated in the process of analyzing 
the Act and preparing the Rules gave their own explanations of what 
they were all about.73  Topics covered included the history of habeas 
                                                                                                               
 71 OPERATING COMMITTEE MINUTES, supra note 64, at 9–10.  
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. at 13–37. 
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corpus in the West, the background to the passage of the Act in Japan, 
the details of specific articles, and the corresponding provisions of 
the Rules and some of the other criminal and civil remedies available 
under Japanese law for wrongful detention (such as a prosecution for 
wrongful imprisonment, a tort claim or claim under the State Redress 
Act for damages) and their deficiencies.74  Some time is spent on the 
technicalities of the court notionally taking custody of the body of the 
unlawfully detained while the proceedings are pending (even though 
this meant delegating administration of the custody to the party being 
accused of wrongful detention) and the effect this had on a detention 
warrant (suspending its effect until the habeas corpus proceeding was 
resolved, even though in practice this meant delegating 
administration of the custody to the authority being accused of 
wrongful detention). 75   The explanation also demonstrated an 
awareness that the remedy might be used to free children or mental 
patients, though such situations were also clearly considered to be 
sideshows to the main event of dealing with detentions by public 
authorities.76 
The floor was then turned over to other participants.  There 
was a general agreement on the need to spread awareness of this 
remedy since, in the words of one judge, the unlawful detentions that 
had been “regrettably” common under the old constitution would not 
go away overnight.77  Another judge remarked that it be important 
that the new law not end up as “just a decoration”—and proceeded to 
suggest that perhaps the police and prosecutors, the people who “have 
direct contact with the people” may not be fully attentive of changes 
in law and thus not aware of when they might be inadvertently (ukkari) 
be violating it or even using “protective custody” (hogo) as a pretext 
to detain suspects as part of a criminal investigation.78   
In response, the only prosecutors present asked whether even 
lawful (tadashiki) prolonged detentions might be subject under article 
4 of the Rules.79  One of the judges (a section head from the Civil 
Affairs Division of the Supreme Court Secretariat) indicated that 
given the speedy trial requirement of article 37 of the Constitution, 
                                                                                                               
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Id. at 35. 
 77 Id. at 38. 
 78 Id. at 40. 
 79 Id. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol12/iss3/3
2017] FROM GREAT WRIT TO TUNING FORK 429 
such detentions could indeed be unlawful for purposes of meeting the 
article 4 threshold.80  In response, the prosecutor explained that part 
of the problem was it took so long to get the relevant court documents 
from the courts.81  In response, one of the lawyers politely pointed 
out that it wasn’t just a matter of paperwork, but of courts failing to 
keep track of the detentions they supposedly controlled, giving an 
example of a suspect who sat in jail for forty-five days because the 
court forgot to summon him to the trial where he was given a 
suspended sentence in absentia.82 
One of the two representatives of the police then spent some 
time explaining how unlawful detentions by the police no longer 
happened, and why they were not to blame for it happening in the 
past: 
Today there are no criminal investigations based on 
unlawful restraints.  And I think it was not something 
where the police were doing things this way, it was the 
momentum of the times.83 
The other police representative steered the conversation to the 
subject of prostitution and how the police were making a concentrated 
effort to stamp out the indentured servitude version of the practice 
that had prevailed in the past, noting however that there were 
instances of this resulting in debts being shaken off.84 
A significant portion of the discussion of the Operating 
Committee focused on nitty gritty procedural issues.  The discussions 
of the Rules show the judiciary to be both well-intentioned, but also 
clearly viewing the habeas corpus proceedings as being focused on 
documents rather than oral hearings.  The lawyers present pushed 
back on this, at one point asking about the possibility of oral rather 
than written petitions, and asking why the laws and the Rules appear 
to allow the court to make a preliminary decision based on the 
pleadings once it received the answer from the respondent (i.e., the 
detaining party).85  Why not summon both petitioner and respondent 
                                                                                                               
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. at 41. 
 82 Id. at 46. 
 83 Id. at 43. 
 84 Id. at 47. 
 85 Id. at 55, 57. 
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to court and force them both to make their case in open court—wasn’t 
that how it worked in the Anglo-Saxon system? 
The lawyers also rejected concerns about abuse, noting that 
since the system anticipated that petitioners would have counsel 
appointed in all but exceptional cases, and the Rules were designed 
to make this even more likely.86  Yet couldn’t frivolous petitions be 
controlled through the system for disciplining attorneys?87 
The minutes reveal a fairly typical Japanese meeting: the 
judicial hosts gave an opening greeting, set forth the agenda, and the 
participants proceeded to comment on each item in turn before ending 
on schedule.  This did not prevent the expression of some vociferous 
dissent by the lawyers present.  Before moving on to the next chapter 
of Japan’s habeas corpus story, it is worth taking note of some of 
these remarks, since they accurately foreshadow the fate that habeas 
corpus would suffer under the regime the Diet and the judiciary had 
established: 
Those of us in government positions and out must be 
through in how we deal with this.  If we do not, it will 
become a mess, just like the jury system.  In England 
the jury is used in high regard, with proper preparatory 
procedures.  But in Japan preparatory procedures were 
bad.  So we need to make sure that the intent of 
[H]abeas [C]orpus [A]ct are clearly appreciated 
without any misunderstanding.88 
and 
If from the start there is a very strict method of review 
based primarily on the fear that this system will be 
abused, this law will never come to life.  The method 
of review must be considered, but if there is a little 
abuse it may not be a bad thing.  If the petitioner’s 
petition makes sense, then the detaining party should 
be investigated in the presence of the petitioner.  If you 
pay attention to the parties, there shouldn’t be 
problems and the law will come to life.  But if the 
                                                                                                               
 86 Id. at 63–65. 
 87 Id. at 65. 
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https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol12/iss3/3
2017] FROM GREAT WRIT TO TUNING FORK 431 
courts act on the basis that their primary concern is to 
avoid abuse, then the door will be closed from the 
outset.89 
Finally, it is worth noting that in the context of discussing who 
has custody over petitioner while his or her petition is pending and 
the way they should be treated, the practice of using police jails to 
hold pre-trial detainees—thereby leaving them under constant police 
control and supervision, an environment readily open to abuse and 
coercion of confessions—also comes up. 90   The daiyō kangoku 
system remains a feature of the criminal justice system in Japan today 
and continues to be identified as part of a pre-trial detention regime 
that can be abused by the police to coerce confessions.91 
VII. HABEAS CORPUS IN ACTION: FURTHER TRIMMING 
From October 1948 until the end of the U.S. occupation (April 
28, 1952), the Supreme Court’s online precedent database shows ten 
decisions about or at least mentioning habeas corpus.  Interestingly, 
all were issued during the first half of this period, between 1948 and 
1950. 
The decisions show a Supreme Court that seems to take any 
opportunity to limit the utility of habeas corpus as a remedy.  For 
example, although article 21 allows appeals of lower court rulings to 
be appealed to the Supreme Court (within three days!) 92 , in a 
December 2, 1950 opinion, the second petty bench noted that, since 
article 46 of the Rules made the Code of Civil Procedure applicable 
where not incompatible with the purpose of the Habeas Corpus Act, 
under article 419-2 of the Code of Civil Procedure in effect at the 
time, appeals from civil judgments would only be accepted by the 
Supreme Court in cases involving constitutional violations.93  This 
meant that even if a lower court finding that a detention was not 
                                                                                                               
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. at 75–76. 
 91 See, e.g., SILVIA CROYDON, THE POLITICS OF POLICE DETENTION IN JAPAN: 
CONSENSUS OF CONVENIENCE (2016) (discussing the use of the daiyō kangoku system for 
police detention). 
 92 Habeas Corpus Act, supra note 14, art. 21. 
 93 Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Dec. 2, 1950, Sho 25 (ku) no. 124, 3 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO 
MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 1159.  The current Code of Civil Procedure was enacted in 1996. 
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“conspicuously” unlawful (the threshold set by article 4 of the Rules94) 
was demonstrably wrong, appeals to the Supreme Court could be 
rejected on the grounds that they asserted a misinterpretation of the 
law rather than a constitutional violation. 
In a similar vein, a December 17, 1949 decision by the Second 
Petty Bench rejected an argument from a petitioner arguing that the 
Rules unfairly closed the door to most habeas corpus petitions.95  
Specifically mentioned were article 6 of the Rules requiring 
petitioners to prove that special circumstances prevented them from 
being represented by counsel (as generally required by article 3 of the 
Habeas Corpus Act), the information and substantiation requirements 
imposed on petitioners through article 7 of the Rules, and the article 
8 requirement that courts reject defective petitions.96  Here, too, the 
Supreme Court characterized this as being an argument that courts 
should conduct their own information gathering.97  It was thus not a 
constitutional claim for purposes of article 419-2 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure and rejected accordingly.98 
On the constitutional front, a December 24, 1949 Third Petty 
Bench decision found that a person whose initial arrest, detention, 
and conviction at initial trial was unlawful, did not qualify as a 
petitioner under article 2 of the Habeas Corpus Act, if the unlawful 
arrest and detention did not have any impact on the trial at the appeal 
level, which would have resulted in the conviction being confirmed.99  
“Even if the proceedings that resulted in the detainee’s detention 
included some unlawfulness, does not mean that, as argued, the 
court’s judgment violates the constitution and is thus void.”100  So, 
problematic arrests or detentions can be remedied on appeal, 
rendering them constitutional, thereby forestalling use of habeas 
corpus to challenge even constitutional procedural defects in a trial 
process leading to a loss of freedom. 
                                                                                                               
 94 Rules, supra note 57, art. 4. 
 95 Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Dec. 17, 1949, Sho 24 (ku) no. 58, 2 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO 
MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 839. 
 96 Rules, supra note 57, art. 6, 7, 8; Habeas Corpus Act, supra note 19, art. 3. 
 97 Id. 
 98 Id. 
 99 Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Dec. 24, 1949, Sho 24 (ku) no. 71, 2 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO 
MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 867. 
 100 Id. 
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The most interesting constitutional challenge during this 
period relates to Cabinet Order 201.101  This was the infamous order 
issued in 1948 at the instigation of GHQ banning public sector 
workers from striking, in spite of the guarantee contained in article 
28 of the Constitution of workers’ rights to organize, collectively 
bargain, and engage in joint action. 102   Workers imprisoned for 
violating this Cabinet Order brought habeas corpus petitions that 
were rejected on the grounds that petitioners were asserting their 
innocence, rather than because it was “obvious and conspicuous that 
the restrain[t] or a judgment order or other disposition relating to the 
restraint has been made without jurisdiction or authority or has been 
remarkably conflicted with formalities or proceedings prescribed in 
laws, orders or rules,” the threshold established by Article 4 of the 
Rules.  In an October 29, 1948 ruling, the Second Petty Bench used 
questionable logic to declare that, despite the petitioners having made 
constitutional arguments in their petition to the lower court, the lower 
court didn’t even mention the constitutional element.103   In their 
appeal to the Supreme Court, the petitioners were simply critical of 
the grounds on which the lower court applied the standard set forth in 
article 4 of the Rules, but failed to make a constitutional argument.104  
The Court did note that the petitioners had asked for a ruling on the 
constitutionality of Cabinet Order 201, but that argument has nothing 
to do with the ruling of the lower court on the habeas corpus 
petition—appeal denied.105 
Granted, as is the case in which the Supreme Court seems 
unduly solicitous of government conduct during the occupation 
period (and possibly thereafter as well), a rhetorical question—what 
else could the court really do?—may offer the most ready explanation.  
The political impossibility of challenging the validity of Cabinet 
Order 201 would have been obvious.  Yet, as we shall see, the habeas 
corpus decisions in this period set the tone for much of what comes 
in habeas corpus jurisprudence (and, the author believes, 
constitutional jurisprudence in general). 
                                                                                                               
 101 Naikaku Sōridaijin Ate Rengō Saikōshireikan Shokan ni Motozuku Rinji Sochi ni 
kansuru Seirei Dai 201 Gō [Cabinet Order in Connection with Provisional Measures based 
on Letter from SCAP to Prime Minister], July 22, 1948, No. 201 of 1948. 
 102 CONSTITUTION, supra note 20, art. 28. 
 103 Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Oct. 29, 1948, Sho 23 (o) no. 88, 2 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO 
MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 391. 
 104 Id. 
 105 Id. 
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During this period, the court also issues its first judgment in a 
type of case that, despite an absence of any clear constitutional 
dimension of the type envisioned in article 1 of the Act, would 
become the staple of habeas corpus litigation for several decades to 
follow—child custody disputes.  In a January 18, 1949 judgment 
which, at three pages, is the longest of all of the court’s habeas corpus 
decisions during this period, the Second Petty Bench denied an appeal 
from a rejection of a habeas corpus petition by a father seeking the 
return of his two young children, allegedly spirited away by his 
estranged wife.106 
Despite allegations that the mother used violent means to take 
the children, the Supreme Court noted that, even were that the case, 
it didn’t change the fact that it was best for the two children—both 
infants—to be with their mother, at least until the parents or a court 
decided what should happen to them after divorce. 107   What is 
interesting about this case is that the dense procedural thicket thrown 
up in other appeals involving detentions by police seems to vanish.  
The lower court got into the substantive legality of “detention” of the 
children by one parent as opposed to the other, and denied the petition 
on those grounds, rather than using procedural rationales to avoid 
substance as in the other cases reviewed. 
VIII. THE WAR CRIMES CASES 
Perhaps the most significant habeas corpus decisions in terms 
of its possible significance as any sort of remedy for constitutional 
violations came shortly after the end of the American occupation in 
the form of petitions filed by two groups of inmates in Sugamo Prison.  
Both groups had been incarcerated as the result of convictions at war 
crimes tribunals in Japan and elsewhere in Asia.  One group consisted 
of Japanese nationals and based their petitions on the grounds that 
their deprivations of freedom resulted from procedures that were 
inconsistent with the Japanese Constitution—a surprisingly 
reasonable argument. 
The other groups were comprised of former Japanese subjects 
of Korean and Taiwanese heritage who lost their Japanese nationality 
when the Treaty of San Francisco went into force on April 28, 1952.  
                                                                                                               
 106 Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Jan. 18, 1949, Sho 23 (o) no. 130, 3 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO 
MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 10 (Japan). 
 107 Id. 
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Article 11 of the treaty declares that “Japan accepts the judgments of 
the International Military Tribunal for the Far East and of other Allied 
War Crimes Courts both within and outside Japan, and will carry out 
the sentences imposed thereby upon Japanese nationals imprisoned 
in Japan.” 108   The argument of this group of former Japanese 
nationals imprisoned in Japan was essentially that, no longer being 
Japanese nationals, there were no longer grounds for continuing to 
detain them. 
The latter case was decided first in July of 1952 and is referred 
to as the Non-Japanese Case.109  The former was decided in April of 
1954 and is referred to as the Japanese Case.110 
Unlike the cases discussed previously, both cases were 
decided by all fifteen of the court’s judges sitting en banc as a Grand 
Bench.  The cases are thus of particular significance, which is 
unsurprising, perhaps given that they represented an opportunity for 
the court to rule on the validity of the “victor’s justice” meted out 
during the occupation era. 
And yet, in both cases, the court did little more than ratify the 
results of the war crimes tribunals and the Japanese government’s 
commitment under the peace treaty to stand by them.  In the Non-
Japanese Case, the court essentially accepted the Japanese 
government’s interpretation—that for purposes of article 11 of the 
peace treaty, the petitioners were still Japanese.111  For good measure, 
one of the judges issued a concurring opinion opining that courts 
should refrain from interpreting treaties differently from the 
executive branch understanding.112 
In the Japanese Case, the petitioners argued that article 11 of 
the peace treaty and its implementing legislation violated the 
constitution (and indeed, those convicted in Japan would have been 
done so through procedures outside the scope of the constitution 
when it was in force).113  The court basically ignored this argument, 
noting that the treaty and related legislation required the enforcement 
                                                                                                               
 108 Treaty of Peace with Japan art. 11, Sept. 8, 1951, 136 U.N.T.S. 46, 56 (entered into 
force Apr. 28, 1952). 
 109 Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] July 30, 1952, Sho 27 (ma) no. 79, 6 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO 
MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 699 (Japan) [hereinafter Non-Japanese Case]. 
 110 Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 26, 1954, Sho 28 (ku) no. 58, 8 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO 
MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 848 (Japan) [hereinafter Japanese Case]. 
 111 Non-Japanese Case, supra note 109. 
 112 Id. 
 113 Japanese Case, supra note 110. 
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of the sentences, therefore the imprisonment of the petitioners was 
not “conspicuously” unlawful and thus did not satisfy the threshold 
requirement of article 4 of the Rules.  This being the case, there was 
no need to rule on the constitutional claim, since the rejection of the 
original petition was justified.114 
This rhetorical effort to make the elephant in the room 
disappear was too much for the judges on the court.  One, Tsuyoshi 
Mano, a former lawyer who supposedly entered the profession after 
having been inspired by reading about president Lincoln freeing the 
slaves, wrote a scathing concurrence: 
While I agree with the conclusion of the majority 
opinion, by not making any judgment on the 
appellant’s claim of constitutional violations in its 
reasoning and just vaguely rejecting the appeal, I 
believe that there is a serious mistake in its legal 
reasoning.115 
He then devotes several paragraphs to excoriating his 
colleagues for failing to conduct basic reasoning and avoiding clarity 
as to the constitutionality of the petitioners’ detention.116  It either was 
constitutional or it wasn’t, and their use of article 4 of the Rules a 
shield to deflect the constitutional issue was unacceptable.  He 
concludes by asserting his own view that the treaty and implementing 
regulation were constitutional, and therefore the detention was not 
problematic either.117 
Another objection in the form of a concurrence was issued by 
Hachiro Fujita, a career judge.  His objection was similar to that of 
Mano’s, that if detention under a law or treaty might be 
unconstitutional, it was inappropriate to reject a habeas corpus 
petition simply on the grounds that it was not conspicuously 
unconstitutional, as the logic of article 4 of the Rules required.118  He 
suggested an alternative approach to arriving at the required 
conclusion, that essentially the obligations under the peace treaty 
                                                                                                               
 114 Id. 
 115 Id. 
 116 Id. 
 117 Id.  Notably, he declined to explain how he arrived at his own conclusions as to 
constitutionality. 
 118 Id. 
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constituted part of Japan’s acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration and 
that they existed outside the constitution.119  To him, this constituted 
preferable grounds for rejecting the appellants’ claims. 
In the long run, perhaps the most significant thing about the 
Japanese Case is that it became the source of key language that is 
cited in subsequent cases, language that appears to have further 
limited the scope of habeas corpus relief, despite appearing to merely 
reiterate language from the Act and the Rules, specifically: 
Only a person physically restrained otherwise than by 
due process under law may petition for relief under the 
Habeas Corpus Act, if it is conspicuous that the 
restraint has been conducted or the judicial decision or 
disposition on restraint has been made without 
authority or in gross violation of the method or 
procedure specified by laws and regulations.120 
This language is followed by the following explanatory phrase: 
Grounds for petitions have been limited in this way, to 
cases in which violations of authority, method or 
procedure are conspicuous, because the Habeas 
Corpus Act is a special method of relief for the people 
establishing the prompt and easy restoration of liberty 
when wrongfully deprived, in accordance with the 
spirit of the constitution and its guarantee of 
fundamental human rights.121 
The notion that limiting grounds for petitions seeking relief 
for deprivations of liberty is somehow consistent with the constitution 
that guarantees liberty is almost Orwellian.  For our purposes, 
however, the more noteworthy part of this language is the 
reaffirmation of the concepts introduced in the Rules, that only 
                                                                                                               
 119 Id. 
 120 Id.  Article 4 of the Rules limits the grounds for a petition to the “conspicuous” 
threshold as previously discussed.  Rules, supra note 57, art. 4.  The language of this opinion 
adds a further limitation on who may file an appeal, despite the “any person” language 
contained in article 2 of the Habeas Corpus Act (and at least the English version of Article 
34 of the Constitution).  CONSTITUTION, supra note 20, art. 34; Habeas Corpus Act, supra 
note 14, art. 2. 
 121 Japanese Case, supra note 110. 
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deprivations of liberty that were conspicuously in violation of 
“authority” (kengen), method (hōshiki) or procedure (tetuzuki) would 
qualify for relief.  In other words, any detentions under imprimatur of 
law or legal process would likely ever get a petitioner as far as a 
hearing before a court in a habeas corpus case. 
IX. HABEAS CORPUS BECOMES A FAMILY AFFAIR 
(MOSTLY) 
The Grand Bench revisited habeas corpus again in a 1958 
decision (referred to below as the “1958 Decision”), in which it 
reiterated a formula similar to that quoted above, and then added the 
following gloss: 
In other words, the person who requests relief under 
the Habeas Corpus Act should face the following 
requirements: the restraint has been conducted or the 
judicial decision, etc. on restraint has been made 
without authority or in gross violation of the method 
or procedure specified by laws and regulations; and 
these facts are conspicuous.”122 
The 1958 Decision was an appeal from a rejection of a habeas 
corpus petition in what would now be called a “child abduction” 
situation.  The facts summarized below (kindly supplied from the trial 
court record by one of the concurring judges) suggest the type of 
dramatic, gripping drama that only family law cases can offer. 
Appellant was an American who cohabited with a geisha (G) 
in a de facto marriage that continued from 1952 until her death in 
1956.  G had two children out of wedlock: one, the “detainee” subject 
to the action (A), and a sibling (B).  G brought both children with her 
to live with Appellant, but B (the eldest son) was soon taken by the 
G’s parents (his grandparents) and lived with them.  A, however 
continued to live with G and Appellant, and called Appellant 
“father.”123 
Around the time of G’s death, one of the grandparents brought 
a successful action in family court to be named A’s guardian, and 
                                                                                                               
 122 Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] May 28, 1958, Sho 32 (o) no. 227, SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO 
SAIBANREI JŌHŌ [SAIBANREI JŌHŌ] 1, 1226. 
 123 Id. at 1237–1238.  
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then brought various other actions seeking the return of the child, 
including their own habeas corpus petition.  Apparently tiring of 
waiting for the wheels of justice to turn, in the January of 1957 they 
took matters into their own hands, waited for A to finish kindergarten, 
and bundled the child into a car.124 
Appellant filed a petition for habeas corpus relief seeking the 
return of the child.  It was rejected, leading to an appeal to the 
Supreme Court.  The majority opinion used the discretion it created 
for itself in article 42 of the Rules to dismiss appeals from lower court 
decisions on habeas corpus petitions without a hearing if it was 
apparent from the pleadings that the appeal had no merit.  The 
majority cited with approval the trial court’s finding that Appellant 
had failed to provide any substantiation, and went so far as to note 
that even if the grandparents’ abduction of the child may have been 
imprudent, that alone did not mean their control over the child was 
without authority or involved conspicuous unlawfulness.125  Here, we 
see how article 4 of the Rules has the possibly unintended effect of 
putting courts in the position of essentially ratifying potentially (but 
not conspicuously) unlawful behavior. 
For a number of reasons, the 1958 Decision can perhaps be 
seen as a turning point, the juncture at which the apex of the Japanese 
judiciary decided to allow the Habeas Corpus Act to sink into relative 
obscurity, never achieving its potential as the constitutional remedy 
that was clearly intended for it.  First, the case reflects the 
normalization of the use of habeas corpus principally in disputes over 
children.  This was of course one of the “private detention[s]” 
anticipated at the legislative and implementation stage debates over 
the Act but never as anything more than a side show.  In the 1958 
Decision, the majority opinion still felt the need to address the 
underlying purpose of the Act by at least noting rhetorically (in the 
pointlessly contorted phraseology that often characterizes court 
opinions from this time) that: “it cannot be said that there are no 
grounds for doubting whether problems such as these should be 
handled as Habeas Corpus cases.” 126   The 1958 Decision helped 
remove any remaining doubts. 
Second, the majority opinion makes a point of confirming that 
the habeas corpus system was not like a criminal or civil trial 
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involving a detailed inquiry into factual or legal problems, but was 
intended to offer a special type of “emergency” judicial relief.127  It 
does so using its own Rule 4 provision allowing courts to reject 
petitions if other remedies are available to challenge the detention.128 
The 1958 Decision confirms that habeas corpus would rarely serve as 
a vehicle for serious inquiry into the facts or law behind a detention 
alleged to be unlawful, at least in any meaningful constitutional sense.  
For the law or facts to be unclear would mean the detention was not 
“conspicuously” unlawful. 
Third, the decision shows a court still highly conflicted about 
habeas corpus, with several judges clearly concerned about the 
direction the court was taking it.  While all of the court’s fifteen 
judges agreed that the appeal should be rejected, five issued 
supplemental opinions and one issued what was in substance a dissent. 
Judge Mano makes another appearance, explaining in one 
paragraph (that refers to earlier opinions) that a court should consider 
a habeas corpus petition regardless of whether the unlawfulness of 
the alleged detention is conspicuous.129  Judge Fujita, also still on the 
court, objected to any interpretation of the conspicuousness 
requirement of article 4 of the Rules that would create an additional 
threshold to the relief promised by article 2 of the statute.130  Judge 
Junzō Kobayashi similarly asserted that the “conspicuous” language 
in the Rules was merely intended to clarify the meaning of the statute 
and shouldn’t be intended foreclosing relief except in cases where the 
unlawfulness of a detention was obvious without the need for any 
investigations of fact or law. 131   “Such an interpretation would 
significantly narrow the situations in which the Habeas Corpus Act 
applied, and would threaten to delegate the law to a largely decorative 
existence.”132 
Judge Ken’ichi Okuno similarly noted that if, as the majority 
seemed to be suggesting, article 4 of the Rules and its 
conspicuousness threshold meant habeas corpus would only apply in 
cases where the grounds for it were so obvious that there was no need 
to engage in fact-finding or resolve any uncertainty of law, then this 
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would have the effect of restricting and changing the language of 
article 2 of the Habeas Corpus Act. That would mean the Rules 
exceeded the scope of the rule-making authority delegated to the 
court by article 23 of the Habeas Corpus Act and thus be unlawful.133 
Judge Daisuke Kawamura similarly objected to the significant 
threshold, declaring that rejecting petitions without examining them 
on this basis would result in many people being denied relief for 
wrongful detention.  A former lawyer, he goes so far as to pose the 
question: “Would this not contravene the personal liberty guaranteed 
by the Constitution of Japan and the spirit of Article 1 of the Act?”134 
Judge Kobayashi also objected to the majority’s casual 
dismissal of the brazen behavior of the grandparents, declining to 
consider it as a component of a potentially “unlawful” detention 
because it happened in the past.135  What sort of a precedent did that 
set?  Finally, he also pointed out a basic logical fallacy of both the 
trial court ruling and the majority’s endorsement of it: that on the one 
hand it involved a conclusion that there were “no disputes between 
the parties as to the principal facts of the case” but saw the 
Appellant’s petition dismissed because it “lacked any 
substantiation.”136  In doing so, he was unknowingly acknowledging 
what would become an identifiable pattern of result-oriented 
jurisprudence that, in the views of the author, came to manifest itself 
in habeas corpus cases and other proceedings in disputes over 
children.137 
As Judge Masuo Shimoizaka similarly pointed out that 
although the judgment of the lower court treats the abduction as a 
thing of the past—no longer an “unlawful” detention—and finds the 
child to be in the loving care of the grandparents, the court was able 
                                                                                                               
133 Id.  Article 41 of the Constitution provides that the Diet is the “sole” law making 
apparatus of the state.  CONSTITUTION, supra note 20, art. 41.  However, article 77 clearly 
vests in the Supreme Court the power to pass, inter alia, rules of procedure and practice. 
CONSTITUTION, supra note 20, art. 77.  There are various theories as to which should prevail 
in the event that a law passed by the Diet conflicts with a Supreme Court rule.  See, e.g., 
ASHIBE NOBUYOSHI & TAKAHASHI KAZUYUKI, KENPŌ [CONSTITUTION] 352–253 (6th ed. 
2015). 
 134 Id. 
 135 Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] May 28, 1958, Sho 32 (o) no. 227, SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO 
SAIBANREI JŌHŌ [SAIBANREI JŌHŌ] 1, 1231. 
 136 Id. at 1232. 
 137 See, generally, Colin P.A. Jones, In the Best Interests of the Court—What North 
American Lawyers Need to Know About Child Custody and Visitation in Japan, 8 ASIA PAC. 
L. & P. J. 167 (2007). 
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to hold all proceedings necessary to arrive at this conclusion a mere 
twenty days after the abduction took place.  He found it hard to agree 
that the situation represented an acceptable “restoration of liberty” or 
that the child actually felt safe and free from detention.  In his view, 
the child was still suffering from a deprivation of liberty.  Although 
the lower court should be commended for acting quickly, it failed to 
consider what was really important in this sort of case: what was best 
for the child going forward.  He thought the appeal should be rejected 
but the case remanded for further proceedings.138  
X. HABEAS CORPUS FROM THEN UNTIL NOW 
The cases discussed so far in this Article reveal what 
happened to habeas corpus at an early stage in its history.  From the 
outset, the Supreme Court—with some dissenting voices—declined 
to use the Habeas Corpus Act as the constitutional remedy it was 
intended to be.  Today, few identify it as a procedure that has anything 
to do with human rights.  This author has not seen any Japanese books 
on the subject of human rights law in which habeas corpus is even 
mentioned in the index.139 
It has not lived up to its potential. In a retrospective piece on 
the Habeas Corpus Act forty years after its enactment, Professor 
Masayoshi Ohtani writes: 
[It] must be pointed out that as far as is apparent from 
the case reporters, there are plenty of instances that 
should appear but do not.  A list of these would include 
(1) arrest for a different charge (bekken taihō) and 
                                                                                                               
 138 Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] May 28, 1958, Sho 32 (o) no. 227, SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO 
SAIBANREI JŌHŌ [SAIBANREI JŌHŌ] 1, 1240. 
 139 The same holds true in constitutional law, with the Habeas Corpus Act receiving no 
mention.  By way of example, Professor Ashibe’s text on the constitutional law is one of the 
most widely accepted introductory texts.  See discussion at supra note 133.  On the subject 
of habeas corpus, its index contains no references to Japan’s Habeas Corpus Act, and on the 
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discussion of the remedy in the Anglo-American constitutional system. 
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detention, 140  (2) emergency arrest, 141  (3) 
investigations and forced confessions in substitute 
prisons, (4) restrictions on bail, (5) prolonged 
detention (6) limits on the defense (including the right 
to request and appointing counsel), (7) improper 
sentencing based on recognition of other crimes, and 
(8) improper administrative actions.  Illegal 
deprivations of freedom such as these were originally 
supposed to be the principal subject of the habeas 
corpus system, and in the Anglo-American system 
these are the principal area in which it operates.  
However in Japan it can be said that it is not 
functioning at all, despite a growing need . . . . In 
conclusion, one has to say that there is nothing 
meaningful to see in terms of the system functioning 
in the area it was originally supposed to.142 
Towards the end of his review of the various contexts in 
which habeas corpus relief has been sought in Japan—mostly 
unsuccessfully—he notes that from the outset it was anticipated that 
habeas corpus might be used for achieving the handover of children. 
However, it turned out that the number of petitioners 
was vastly greater than anticipated.  On this point, it 
could be seen as an appositional phenomenon when 
compared to the unexpectedly low number of 
instances involving criminal procedures and other 
detentions by authorities.  Viewed from the original 
aims of the system, this is clearly an exceptional 
                                                                                                               
 140 Those who have spent long enough watching Japanese news may have noticed that 
it seems very rare for anyone to be arrested for murder.  The more common charge is to be 
arrested for unlawfully disposing of a dead body, the existence of a dead body presumably 
providing adequate probable cause.  Once in custody, the suspect is then encouraged to 
confess and then formally arrested for murder, already in police custody. 
 141 Despite the Constitution permitting arrests only pursuant to an arrest or if the crime 
is committed in the presence of the arresting officer or other person, article 210 of the Code 
of Criminal Procedure allows police to make an “emergency arrest” (kinkyū taiho) of a 
suspect who has likely committed a serious offense, without either a warrant or the crime 
being committed in the presence of the arresting officer.  C. Crim. Pro., supra note 37, art. 
210. 
 142 Ōtani Masayoshi, Jinshinhogohō no 40 Nen [40 Years of the Habeas Corpus Act], 
60:5 HŌRITSU RONSŌ 207, 228 (1988). 
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situation.  Notwithstanding the criticism of some 
observers of the extent of such use, it appears to have 
some special feature that is necessary to satisfy a 
social need.143 
He closes by noting a highly problematic jurisprudence in 
what had come to be a widely used remedy within the sphere of 
family law. 
The use of habeas corpus in family cases had already been 
evident a decade earlier, when Professor Takashi Ohmiya devoted a 
sixty-page article in a suitably obscure law review to the subject of 
the use of habeas corpus to achieve the handover (hikiwatashi) of 
infant children.144  He had ample material to work with; his article 
analyzes over fifty cases from all levels of the judiciary, and he starts 
his analysis noting that in such cases “the best interests and welfare 
of the child must be the most important consideration.”145 
Professor Ohmiya describes habeas corpus as functioning as 
a “provisional disposition” for deciding where a child should live 
until permanent custody arrangements are sorted out by the courts.146  
Available for his analysis is an extensive body of jurisprudence 
involving considerations such as violent takings and “maternal 
deprivation” that developed around these cases. 147   The original 
purpose of the law is barely mentioned, and one would struggle to 
find a constitutional linkage between this jurisdiction and the 
constitutional ideals mentioned in article 1 of the Habeas Corpus 
Act.148 
XI. THE COURT STEPS IN AGAIN 
Although Professor Ohtani saw habeas corpus as addressing 
a social need in family cases, a few years after he published his 
                                                                                                               
 143 Id. at 236. 
 144 Takashi Ohmiya, Kodomo no Hikiwatashi Seikyū to Jinshinhogohō (1) [Demands to 
Hand Over Children and the Habeas Corpus Act (1)], 14 HOKKAIDŌ KOMAZAWA DAIGAKU 
KENKYŪ KIYŌ 41 (1979). 
 145 Id. 
 146 Id. 
 147 Id. 
 148 This comment is not intended as a criticism of Professor Ohmiya.  To the author’s 
knowledge, the Japanese Supreme Court has never issued a decision clearly identifying a 
constitutionally-significant dimension to the parent-child relationship. 
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retrospective, the Supreme Court issued a decision indicating that 
perhaps the remedy was being sought and granted too frequently.  On 
October 19, 1993 the Third Petty Bench pushed habeas corpus into 
the background even in the limited universe of family law.  This 
decision is referred to as the “1993 Decision.”149 
The case involved an appeal from a lower court opinion 
ordering the return of two children to their mother from their father, 
her estranged husband, and his parents.  Determining that the home 
environment and standard of living offered by both parents were not 
markedly different, the lower court had relied on what was at the time 
a standard judicial practice of preferring mothers to fathers in cases 
involving young infants and ordered the return.150 
The Third Petty Bench upheld the father’s appeal, quashing 
the lower court decision and remanding for further proceedings.151  
The court addressed what even today remains a basic legal 
conundrum arising in cases involving the children of estranged yet 
still legally married parents; under article 818 of the Japanese Civil 
Code, parental authority (including what would now be called 
“physical custody” or “care and control”) is exercised jointly by both 
parents during marriage.152  While courts can make a provisional 
determination of physical custody prior to divorce, 153  parental 
authority may only be vested in one parent (and only one parent, joint 
parental authority out of marriage not being provided for) upon 
divorce.154  Accordingly, before a court makes any dispositions on 
where and by whom the children should be raised, both parents are 
arguably within their rights making those decisions, even if they 
conflict.  This being the case, it was particularly miraculous that 
courts over the preceding decades had been successful in finding 
instances of conspicuous unlawfulness in “detentions” of these types 
while persistently failing to do so in cases involving state actors.  The 
Court addressed this conundrum by declaring: 
When the husband and the wife jointly exercise 
parental authority over their infant child, the custody 
                                                                                                               
 149 Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Oct. 19, 1993, Hei 5 (o) no. 609, SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO 
SAIBANSHO SAIBANREI JŌHŌ [SAIBANREI JŌHŌ] 1, 5099. 
 150 Id. at 5102. 
 151 Id. at 5099. 
 152 MINPŌ [CIV. C.] 1896, art. 818, no. 89 [hereinafter CIV. C.]. 
 153 Id. art. 766. 
 154 Id. art. 819. 
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of the child by either the husband or the wife should 
be deemed to be legal under parental authority unless 
there are special circumstances.  Therefore, in order to 
prove that the custody or restraint by either the 
husband or the wife is conspicuously illegal as 
referred to in Article 4 of the Habeas Corpus Rules, 
such custody must be evidently more detrimental to 
the child’s welfare.155 
In short, the Court decided that the “conspicuously illegal” 
threshold it created for itself in the Rules and had used to avoid using 
habeas corpus for its original purpose should henceforth be used to 
filter most of the “exceptional” child abduction cases out as well.  To 
be fair, the Court was also pointing out another basic flaw (from the 
Court’s perspective) of using habeas corpus relief in child custody 
disputes: Japan has an entire system of courts devoted to dealing with 
such cases, one that has specialized resources and personnel lacking 
at the District Courts which receive habeas corpus petitions.  As 
declared by the Court: 
A dispute over custody of an infant child between the 
child’s parents or the husband and the wife who have 
joint parental authority but live separately, as in this 
case, is basically subject to the exclusive jurisdiction 
of family courts, and the system for adjudication of 
domestic relations as well as the human and material 
resources of family courts exist particularly for the 
purpose of investigating and adjudicating such dispute.  
In cases where there is no danger to the infant child 
nor is there any urgent problem concerning the 
custody or rearing of the child, as in the present case, 
it is impossible to find any reason to request relief 
under the Habeas Corpus Act.156 
                                                                                                               
 155 See Judgment Concerning the Conspicuous Illegality of the Restraint Required in 
Cases where Either the Husband or the Wife Requests the Other Party to Deliver Their Infant 
Child under the Habeas Corpus Act, SUP. CT. JAPAN (1993), http://www.courts.go.jp/
app/hanrei_en/detail?id=1429 [https://perma.cc/3SEA-83WW] (presenting an English 
translation of the judgment). 
 156 Id. 
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Thereafter, habeas corpus relief became more unusual even in 
these cases.  This is illustrated by a study conducted by the Ninth 
Civil Division of the Tokyo District Court and published in a 2007 
issue of Hanrei Jihō, one of Japan’s most prestigious law journals.157  
This study is referred to in this Court as the “Tokyo District Court 
Study” and its review of habeas corpus petitions filed in the Tokyo 
District Court from 2004 through 2006 revealed forty-three petitions, 
approximately 70% of which were over the handover of a child.158  
This represented an increase over a prior study of the court for cases 
in the year 1990 and 1991, in which sixty cases were of this type.159 
Of all of the petitions reviewed in the 2007 study, only one 
was granted.  Five were resolved through settlements between the 
parties (wakai), and fourteen saw the petitions withdrawn.160   
Recall that the withdrawal of petitions was a procedural 
option not provided for in the law nor added in the Rules.  A lawyer 
in the 1948 Operating Committee had presciently objected to 
allowing withdrawal of petitions because it could encourage coercion 
to do so by the detaining party. 161  Yet the District Court Study 
indicates the court unofficially “recommending” petitions be 
withdrawn in cases involving children has become an accepted 
practice.162  
                                                                                                               
 157 Tōkyō Chisai ni okeru Saikin no Jinshin Hogo Seikyū Jiken no Shori Jōkyō [The 
Disposition of Recent Habeas Corpus Petitions in the Tokyo District Court], 1961 HANREI 
JIHŌ [HANJI] 3 (2007) [hereinafter Tokyo District Court Study]. 
 158 Id.  The other types of claim included: (1) several petitions from a detainee claiming 
his imprisonment was based on forged documents (all rejected on procedural grounds); (2) 
a petition from chess champion Bobby Fischer who was detained in Narita at the instigation 
of U.S. authorities for the (in retrospect bizarre) offense of having played a chess match in 
Yugoslavia in 1992 (withdrawn after he was granted asylum and citizenship in Iceland); (3) 
several petition from prison inmate seeking a transfer to a hospital prison due to a health 
conditions (rejected on substantive grounds); (4) several petitions from prison inmates 
making various complaints about the warden, including one complaining specifically about 
the food (all rejected on procedural or substantive grounds); (5) two petitions filed by 
prisoners immediately after their convictions were confirmed by the Supreme Court, both 
asserting their innocence (one rejected on procedural grounds, the other on substantive); and 
(6) one petition filed by brothers fighting over “possession” of an elderly mother 
(withdrawn). 
 159 Tōkyō Chisai ni okeru Saikin no Jinshin Hogo Seikyū Jiken no Shori Jōkyō [The 
Disposition of Recent Habeas Corpus Petitions in the Tokyo District Court], 1431 HANREI 
JIHŌ [HANJI] 14 (1992). 
 160 Tokyo District Court Study, supra note 157, at 30. 
 161 OPERATING COMMITTEE MINUTES, supra note 64, at 63. 
 162 Tokyo District Court Study, supra note 157, at 10.  On the subject of withdrawing 
petitions, an interesting example of the process of entropy that beset habeas corpus can be 
seen in a 1956 case involving a successful petition resulting in a patient being ordered 
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The Tokyo District Court Study also shows courts to have 
recast the “absence of other remedies” requirement added by article 
4 of the Rules into a requirement of hojūsei, a term that could be 
translated “supplementariness,” further relegating habeas corpus to 
the realm of an obscure remedy that is rarely, if ever, available and 
acting as a concept that serves as additional grounds for rejecting a 
petition.  As noted in the study: 
At the very least, in cases between parents both vested 
with parental authority, the general rule made clear 
from precedent is that family court proceedings 
starting with preservative dispositions under the 
Domestic Relations Act.  If a habeas corpus petition is 
filed without going through these procedures, there is 
a high probability that it will be dismissed for lacking 
supplementariness or that it will not satisfy the 
requirement that the conspicuous illegality be readily 
apparent . . . [i]f a petitioner has not first gone through 
family court proceedings, our court lets them know 
and as a result, the majority of cases are withdrawn 
before any substantive examination takes place.163 
Of course, the rationale of the courts in resolving these cases 
is hard to refute.  Why parents (and their counsel) seek habeas corpus 
relief in cases involving children despite the availability of court 
proceedings should probably be explained.  First, family court 
procedures take time; there is a requirement that all disputes of this 
type first go through court-sponsored conciliation, which may span 
for months and during which the left-behind-parent may have little or 
no contact with his or her child; many parents are understandably 
impatient in such situations; and those who are forewarned of the 
inefficacy of family courts (particularly fathers who may—rightly or 
wrongly—perceive a bias against them in favor of mothers) may be 
inclined to seek relief under a statute that at least  purports to offer 
                                                                                                               
released from a mental hospital by the trial court.  The Supreme Court overturned this 
decision and remanded it to the trial court for further proceedings.  The trial court rejected 
efforts by the (now free) petitioner to withdraw his petition and ordered him back into the 
custody of the mental hospital.  See Yamamoto Kōzō, Hanrei Jinshinhogohō [The Cases on 
the Habeas Corpus Act], 62 DOSHISHA HōGAKU, Oct. 1960, at 57, 60 (defining petition 
withdrawals). 
 163 Tokyo District Court Study, supra note 157, at 12 (emphasis added). 
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“fast” and “easy” relief.164  Second, although family courts can order 
the handover of a child as a provisional remedy, there are few 
sanctions for not complying with family court orders or even 
agreements made by the other party.165  Only the Habeas Corpus Act 
offers the threat of criminal sanctions for non-compliance, or for 
failing to “produce the body” by bringing the detained party to 
court.166   Though, even with respect to habeas corpus, the Study 
indicates that there are no (other) mechanisms for enforcing a 
judgment granting a petition.167  Moreover, for the criminal sanctions 
to matter, police or prosecutors must care enough to enforce them; 
the author is aware of only one case in which even the possibility of 
criminal charges was triggered for non-compliance in a habeas corpus 
case, though it does not appear to have been reported anywhere. 
In any case, the Tokyo District Court Study reveals a 
procedural regime that functions in a way that ensures a hearing 
almost never happens in any case.  Only two of the cases surveyed 
(2.6% of the total) resulted in writs of habeas corpus being granted 
and thus hearings.168  Thus, in actual trials in which the detaining 
party “produces the body” of the detained party to the court and is 
required to explain the reasons for the detention in front of the 
prisoner, the original purpose of habeas corpus has been effectively 
excised from the act.  In fact, the Tokyo District Court Study betrays 
what comes across as grumbling about hearings when they do occur: 
the requirement that a judgment be issued the same day as the hearing 
is inflexible, the court must make a yes-or-no decision about who the 
custodian of the children is, and the parties submit pleadings full of 
subjective, conflicting evidence.169  In short, all the things that were 
intended to be features in habeas corpus as originally conceived are 
perceived as bugs in the remedy as it has been shaped by the court.  
Not only that, but the lawyers who represent the detained (the 
children) are described as poorly suited to the task of representing 
                                                                                                               
 164 Habeas Corpus Act, supra note 14, art. 1. 
 165 Jones, supra note 137, at 245–257.  Note, however, that the procedural regime for 
enforcing handovers has changed since the time this article was written, though the basic 
problem with enforceability has not. 
 166 Habeas Corpus Act, supra note 14, art. 18. 
 167 Tokyo District Court Study, supra note 157, at 10. 
 168 Id. at 4. 
 169 Id. at 10. 
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them compared to the lawyers and expert investigators of family 
courts.170 
XII. THE SHADOW OF HABEAS CORPUS TODAY 
As is hopefully clear, habeas corpus in Japan has become 
almost completely meaningless—at best it is a tuning fork used to 
make other proceedings work a bit more harmoniously.  Not only has 
it become meaningless when compared to its original purpose, but it 
is largely meaningless even within the context of the limited purpose 
it has been allowed to serve in recent years. 
Let us revisit article 1 of the Habeas Corpus Act, which I have 
tried to render into a more grammatical, less quirky English 
translation than the one promulgated in 1948: 
The purpose of this law is for the Japanese people to 
have their personal freedom quickly and easily 
restored through the courts when actually and 
wrongfully deprived of it, in accordance with the 
Constitution of Japan and its guarantee of fundamental 
human rights.171 
As already described in length, court practice and article 4 of 
the Rules have ensured that habeas corpus is neither quick nor easy, 
or even available most of the time.  More fundamentally, however, to 
the author’s knowledge no one has ever indicated the “fundamental 
human rights”172 implicated in the child custody cases that became 
the mainstay of habeas corpus jurisprudence.  While the Supreme 
Court in its 1993 Decision rightly pointed out the difficulty of finding 
conspicuous illegality in cases involving disputes among parents both 
having parental authority, it failed to identify what constitutional 
rights would be violated even in situations when this threshold was 
met.173  Remember, habeas corpus was intended to give life to article 
                                                                                                               
 170 Id. 
 171 Habeas Corpus Act, supra note 14, art. 1 (author translation). 
 172 Id. 
 173 Interestingly, habeas corpus could have but never actually did play a meaningful role 
in countering the criticism levelled against the role of Japanese judiciary in Japan becoming 
viewed internationally as a haven for international parental child abduction prior to its 
ratification of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction 
in 2014.  Although prior to this there were countless instances of foreign parents seeking the 
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34 and possibly a few other provisions of the constitution, none of 
which are implicated in child custody cases. 
To the author’s knowledge, no court or commentator has dealt 
with the very basic question: does a child—an infant in many of these 
cases—even have “personal freedom,” and, even if they do, is it being 
“deprived” by living with dad, going to kindergarten, and seeing 
grandma?174  This is not to trivialize the problems involved in these 
cases or the potentially negative impact they may have on children, 
an impact well worth judicial attention.  The fact remains, however, 
that there is a basic failure to identify any constitutional dimension to 
these cases, just as Japan’s Supreme Court has failed to identify any 
constitutionally-protected dimension in the parent-child relationship 
generally.175 
It might be possible to argue that Article 1 of the Habeas 
Corpus Act is merely hortatory and that even if the remedy the act 
establishes has ended up being an obscure and supplementary one, it 
is at least a remedy.  This is perhaps true, but it is worth pointing out 
that even in this context, it is largely meaningless for another key 
reason, a reason related directly to how the Supreme Court has chosen 
to shape it over the years: in the rare instance when a habeas corpus 
                                                                                                               
return of children abducted to Japan from foreign countries (including numerous instances 
where this was done in violation of foreign law and/or court orders) by a Japanese parent, 
both through habeas corpus and other remedies available in the family court system, virtually 
no children were ever returned.  See generally, Jones, supra note 137.  Interestingly, habeas 
corpus petitioners failed in these cases despite a 2003 Supreme Court decision upholding the 
arrest and conviction under an obscure anti-human trafficking provision of the Penal Code 
of a foreign father trying to leave Japan, in part due to the greater degree of illegality of 
removing children across borders.  See Colin P.A. Jones, No More Excuses: Why Recent 
Penal Code Amendments Should (But Probably Won’t) Stop International Parental Child 
Abduction to Japan, 6 WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 351 (2007) (discussing the effect 
of amendments of the penal code on parental child abduction in Japan). 
 174 Habeas Corpus Act, supra note 14, art. 1.  The closest the court came to dealing with 
this issue involved a rather fanciful application of logic.  In a July 4, 1968 decision of the 
First Petty Bench declared that it was clearly established by prior precedent (including the 
1958 Decision) that “exercising custody over an infant lacking capacity to form intent 
naturally involves restricting the personal freedom of the infant, but that does not prevent 
such restrictions from being deemed “detention” under the Habeas Corpus Act or the rules 
thereunder.”  In other words, because the exercise of custody naturally involves the 
restriction of the freedom of children, such custody can be exercised in a “conspicuously 
unlawful” manner for habeas corpus purposes. 
 175 It is also worth noting that in cases involving children courts have somehow managed 
to avoid getting tied up in the restrictions it sought to impose on “real” detainees, the ones 
intended to minimize instances when petitioners were filed by someone other than the 
detainee, as described infra, and possibly over the objections of the detainee.  
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petition actually does result in a hearing, the hearing itself will almost 
certainly be a meaningless formality. 
This is because with “conspicuous” illegality established by 
the Rules and precedent as the threshold a petitioner must satisfy for 
a petition to be accepted by a court, acceptance by the court means it 
will have already made up its mind as to how to decide based on the 
pleadings. 
In child custody cases, this should be entirely unsurprising 
since, as indicated by the Tokyo District Court’s description of its 
own practice, petitioners would first be required to exhaust their 
options at family court.176  A habeas corpus petition being accepted 
would mean that the petitioner already has a custody decree or other 
orders from a family court (in proceedings that were unlikely to have 
been either quick or easy).  Lacking the specialized expertise and 
resources of a family court, which (hopefully) will have already 
devoted significant time and resources to understanding the situation 
of the children at issue and what should be done for them, how could 
a District Court do anything other than ratifying a decision already 
made elsewhere? 
As noted by the Tokyo District Court Study, cases involving 
children mostly involve violations of family court decrees (i.e., by the 
“detaining” parent).177  A decade’s worth of informal discussions by 
this author with lawyers and former judges involved in child custody 
matters confirm the view that habeas corpus hearings are not a place 
where judges make decisions based on oral arguments; they are often 
a meaningless formality leading to a preordained conclusion.178 
                                                                                                               
 176 Tokyo District Court Study, supra note 157, at 10. 
 177 Tokyo District Court Study, supra note 157, at 6. 
 178 The author would venture that another key feature of habeas corpus has also been 
rendered largely meaningless—the requirement that the detained party have counsel 
appointed, at state expense, if necessary.  While many parents might welcome the 
appointment of independent counsel for a child abducted by the other parent, it seems 
unlikely that a lawyer appointed to represent the child would be in a position to advocate for 
anything different from what the family court has already decided is in his or her best 
interests. 
  The role of  habeas corpus even in child custody cases may be shunted further into 
the background in connection with the implementation by Japan of the Hague Convention 
on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, which went into effect in Japan on 
April 1, 2014.  Japan’s implementing legislation and related rules provide for an entire 
procedural regime by which Japan’s courts would review petitions for return of children 
under the treaty, though it was unsure how (and if enforcement would work).  See, e.g., Colin 
P.A. Jones, Towards an “Asian” Child Abduction Treaty? Some Observations on Singapore 
and Japan Joining the Hague Convention (Asian Law Institute Working Paper Series No. 
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The meaninglessness of habeas corpus hearings when they do 
happen is suggested by an interesting tort case brought against the 
presiding judge of the Himeji Branch of the Kobe District Court over 
a 2001 habeas corpus case that involved no less than four hearings.179  
The father “detaining” the two children failed to bring them to the 
first hearing (because they were in Texas for medical reasons, he 
explained later), but he did bring them to the next hearing.180  Before 
the hearing, he reluctantly surrendered the children to court personnel, 
and they did not participate in the proceedings.181  The court then 
heard from the petitioning mother, counsel for the detained children, 
and the father before issuing a “provisional” disposition ordering the 
children handed over to the mother. 182   This transfer was 
accomplished by the simple expedient of ensuring she left the 
courtroom first and then physically preventing the father from leaving 
until she was gone with the children.183   Unsurprisingly, the two 
subsequent hearings upheld the “provisional” ruling and the tort 
claim against the presiding judge (and the state) was unsuccessful.  
There may be little to commend the father in his actions in this case, 
but it is a case that illustrates the generally meaningless nature of 
habeas corpus proceedings.184 
Thus, what Anglo-American lawyers would likely regard as 
the most important and meaningful aspect of habeas corpus 
                                                                                                               
031, 2013) (discussing effect of the Hague Convention on Japan).  Three years since taking 
effect, cases in which return orders by Japanese courts have proven unenforceable have 
started to receive attention, but in no instance that the author is aware of has habeas corpus 
been suggested on the Japanese side as a final remedy (and the only one with possible penal 
sanctions for non-compliance).  See Simon Scott, Three Years After Japan Signed Hague, 
Parents Who Abduct Still Win, JAPAN TIMEs (May  1, 2017): http://www.japantimes.co.jp/
community/2017/05/01/issues/three-years-japan-signed-hague-parents-abduct-still-
win/#.WQ_JtTdUvIU [https://perma.cc/NG9L-XS8P].   
 179 Kōbe Chihō Saibansho [Kōbe Dist. Ct.] Apr. 15, 2002, Hei 13 (gyō u) no. 20, SAIKŌ 
SAIBANSHO SAIBANSHO SAIBANREI JŌHŌ [SAIBANREI JŌHŌ] 1, http://www.courts.go.jp/app/
hanrei_jp/detail4?id=7221 [https://perma.cc/3ZPK-PT42]. 
 180 Id.  
 181 Note that the parties intended to play a leading role in habeas corpus as it was 
originally designed—the detained persons—do not even appear in the courtroom in this type 
of case!  Note that they should, in the case of infants, but this serves as further illustration of 
how far habeas corpus has come from its textual origins and legislative intent. 
 182 Kōbe Chihō Saibansho [Kōbe Dist. Ct.] Apr. 15, 2002, Hei 13 (gyō u) no. 20, SAIKŌ 
SAIBANSHO SAIBANSHO SAIBANREI JŌHŌ [SAIBANREI JŌHŌ] 1, http://www.courts.go.jp/app/
hanrei_jp/detail4?id=7221 [https://perma.cc/3ZPK-PT42]. 
 183 Id. 
 184 Recent informal discussions between the author and lawyers handling habeas corpus 
cases seem to confirm that the results of hearings are preordained. 
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proceedings, the hearing at which a detaining party and his prisoner 
confront each other and argue over the constitutional or other legal 
principles involved, has been effectively excised from habeas corpus 
in Japan through Supreme Court rules and judicial practice.  This has 
resulted in the Habeas Corpus Act becoming not a tool of the 
Japanese people for enforcing the constitution, as was unequivocally 
the original intent, but a tool by which courts at least double-check, 
but almost always ratify decisions regarding child custody or 
detention made elsewhere.  Japan’s judiciary prevented habeas 
corpus from being abused by destroying it. 
Perhaps there is some value to even the small role habeas 
corpus has retained.  But the fact that many of the practices used by 
police and prosecutors to coerce suspects into confessing that were 
cited at the time of the Habeas Corpus Act’s adoption—prolonged, 
coercive detentions, limited bail, and so forth—remain an integral 
and frequently-criticized feature of the Japanese criminal justice 
system today would not seem to say very much about the state of the 
constitutional protections in this sphere. 
XIII. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In fairness, habeas corpus—and perhaps constitutions—may 
be overrated and idealized by Anglo-American jurists.  As has been 
pointed out by Professor Paul Halliday, the history of the 
development of habeas corpus in the West may have been as much 
about the establishment of the superiority of Royal Courts compared 
to other courts and authorities, first in England then later throughout 
the British Empire.185  In this light, habeas corpus was as much a tool 
for helping to establish a judicial hierarchy.  It has arguably played 
the same role in the United States, where it was first canonized 
through its protection in the U.S. Constitution and subsequently 
enabled federal courts to establish their superiority over state courts 
by providing a means for the former to review the constitutionality of 
proceedings leading to the latter resulting in deprivations of freedom. 
As suggested by Professor Halliday in his concluding remarks, 
the key to the success of habeas corpus—where it actually was 
successful—was “a powerful court.” 186   Even within the British 
                                                                                                               
 185 See generally, PAUL D. HALLIDAY, HABEAS CORPUS FROM ENGLAND TO EMPIRE (2010) 
(providing a historical and empirical analysis of the writ of habeas corpus). 
 186 Id. at 301. 
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Empire, however, where powerful courts were lacking, “habeas 
corpus operated as only a shadow of its theoretical self.”187 
It is widely acknowledged that, with some exceptions, Japan 
lacks powerful courts and Japanese people have low expectations of 
the judiciary.188  Those courts it does have are part of a national 
bureaucracy with a hierarchy that is both defined by law and subject 
to a much more detailed, unwritten stratigraphy that is unofficial but 
well-known by insiders. 189   Moreover, despite constitutional 
separation of powers, on a working level the judiciary maintains 
relations with executive branch agencies, particularly the Ministry of 
Justice (which is run by prosecutors).190  A remedy like habeas corpus, 
which could set individual courts at odds with each other outside of 
the framework of the established hierarchy or upset institutionalized 
working-level relationships with other government institutions, is a 
remedy the judiciary probably doesn’t need—even if the people of 
Japan might. 
As noted at the outset, the author believes that what happened 
to habeas corpus in Japan is likely symptomatic of what has happened 
to other ideals reflected in the constitution.  This includes the ideals 
that the Habeas Corpus Act was supposed to realize.  What happened 
to habeas corpus may be an extreme example, but at the same time 
one that is particularly easy to distinguish and track, given the discrete, 
specific nature of the remedy, the constitutional principal to which it 
relates, and its readily verifiable fate down a dirt road of judicial 
desuetude. 
 
                                                                                                               
 187 Id. 
 188 See, e.g., SHIGENORI MATSUI, THE CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN: A CONTEXTUAL 
ANALYSIS 150 (2011) (“Since most of the public had not expected the courts to play much 
active role in solving legal disputes in general, it is natural that they had not expected the 
courts to enforce the Constitution more vigorously.”); CARL GOODMAN, THE RULE OF LAW 
IN JAPAN: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 262 (2003) (noting the weak enforcement powers and 
other limitations of Japanese courts). 
 189 See, e.g., SEGI HIROSHI, NIPPON NO SAIBAN [JAPANESE TRIALS] (2015). 
 190 This can be confirmed by reviewing any edition of the Seikan Yōran, a quarterly 
directory of national government institutions and the politicians and bureaucrats who serve 
in them, published by Seikan Yōransha (http://www.seisakujihou.co.jp).  This directory 
shows that any given time most of the bureau chiefs and other leadership positions in the 
Ministry of Justice are filled by prosecutors.  It also shows that some positions in the MOJ 
and other executive branch institutions (such as the Cabinet Legislation Bureau) are filled 
by people who have previously been working in the judiciary. 
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XIV. APPENDIX 1: HABEAS CORPUS ACT191 
Article 1.  In accordance with the principle [sic] of the 
Japanese Constitution which guarantees the fundamental human 
rights, this Law aims at the rapid and easy recovery by the judicial 
court of the freedom of the person which is illegally restrained. 
Article 2.  A person whose freedom of action is restrained 
without the proper legal procedure may apply for its recover in 
accordance with the provisions of this law. 
Any person may present the preceding application on behalf 
of the person who is held under such restraint. 
Article 3.  The application mentioned in the preceding Article 
shall be made by attorney on behalf of the restrained person.  
However, in cases where there exist extraordinary circumstances, it 
can be made by the applicant himself. 
Article 4.  The application provided for in Article 2 may be 
presented in writing orally to the High Court or District Court which 
has the [sic] jurisdiction over the district where the restrained, the 
restrainer or the application [sic: applicant] resides. 
Article 5.  Such application in writing shall contain the 
following items specifically, and it shall be offered with necessary 
materials for presumptive proof: 
1.  Name of the restrained; 
2.  Purpose of the request; 
3.  Fact of the detention; 
4.  Restrainer known: 
5.  Place of detention known. 
Article 6.  The Law Court must make decision without delay 
on the request under Article 2. 
Article 7.  The Court may, in cases where the application 
lacks requisite vindications or necessary presumptive proof dismiss it 
by a decision. 
Article 8.  Upon receipt of the application provided for in 
Article 2, the Court may, by request of the applicant or through its 
authority transfer the case to another Court considered to have 
competent jurisdiction. 
                                                                                                               
 191 Habeas Corpus Act, supra note 14. This English version is presented as it appears in 
the English version of the Official Gazette, including errors in grammar and spelling together 
with quirky expressions. 
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Article 9.  The Court may, except [sic; in] the cases 
prescribed in the preceding two Articles, immediately make the 
necessary inquiry, in order to prepare for investigations at the time of 
trial, into the reason for the restraint and other matters by conducting 
a hearing on the statement made by the restrained, the applicant and 
their attorneys and other interested parties. 
The Court may cause the members of the collegiate court to 
make the preliminary inquiry mentioned in the preceding paragraph. 
Article 10.  In case of necessity, the Court may release in 
order to release the restrained person temporarily by its decision, 
either under each that the restrained shall present himself at any time 
when summoned or on the conditions deemed proper, or may 
otherwise take appropriate steps prior to conducting the trial provided 
for in Article 16. 
In the case where the restrained person under the preceding 
Article shall not present himself, he may be arrested. 
Article 11.  The Court may dismiss the application (for such 
releases) without any proceeding for trial, when it has become evident 
through the preliminary inquiry that there exists no ground justifying 
the said application. 
When the court makes the decision under the preceding 
paragraph, it shall rescind the disposal carried out before under 
Article 10 and, causing the restrained person to present himself, hand 
him to the restrainer. 
Article 12.  Except in case of Article 7 or Paragraph1 of the 
preceding Article, the Court shall designate a certain date and place 
and summon for trial the applicant or his attorney, the restrained 
person and the restrainer. 
While issuing a habeas corpus warrant to the restrainer to 
cause the person so restrained to appear at the designated date and 
place provided for in the preceding paragraph, the Court shall direct 
him to submit a written answer concerning the date, place of and the 
reason for such restraint, by the day of the trial mentioned in the 
preceding paragraph. 
In the warrant mentioned in the preceding paragraph, the fact 
that if the restrainer does not obey the said warrant, he may be placed 
under arrest or taken into custody until he obeys the order and shall 
be liable to a fine not exceeding \500 for each day’s delay shall be 
explicitly stated. 
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There shall be a period of three days between the forwarding 
of the said warrant and the day of trial.  However, the trial shall be 
held within one week from the date under which the request under 
Article 2 was made.  This period may be shortened or prolonged, as 
the case may be. 
Article 13. The order mentioned in the preceding Article shall 
be notified to the Court which has issued the warrant concerning the 
restraint and to the Procurator. 
The Judges of the Court and the Procurator mentioned in the 
preceding paragraph may present themselves on the day of trial. 
Article 14. The investigations on the day of the trial shall be 
conducted at an open court attended by the restrained person, the 
restrainer, the applicant and his attorney. 
When there is no such attorney, the Court shall select one 
from among the qualified lawyers. 
The attorneys under the preceding paragraph may request for 
travelling expenses, daily allowances, hotel expenses and 
compensation. 
Article 15. On the day of the trial, the Court, upon hearing the 
statement of the applicant and the reply of the restrainer, shall conduct 
investigations on materials for presumptive proof. 
The restrainer shall clarify the reasons for detentions. 
Article 16. If the Court, upon investigations [sic], finds such 
application groundless, it shall dismiss it by decision and hand over 
to the restrainer the person so detained. 
In the case of the preceding paragraph, the provisions of 
Article 11, Paragraph 2 shall apply. 
In cases where the application is based on sufficient ground, 
the court shall forthwith release the person under restraint. 
Article 17. In the trial provided for in Article 7, Article 11, 
Paragraph 1, and in the preceding Article, the Court may saddle [sic] 
the restrainer or the applicant with the entire costs spent in the 
procedure, or a part thereof. 
Article 18. In cases where the restrainer refuses to obey the 
order mentioned in Article 12, Paragraph 2, the Court may arrest him 
or keep him in custody until he obeys the order, and impose on him a 
fine not exceeding \500 per each day’s delay. 
Article 19. The restrainer, if notified by the person under 
restraint that the requests the benefit of an attorney on his behalf, shall 
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immediately notify the request to the attorney whom he may 
nominate. 
Article 20. The Court which has received the application 
provided for in Article 2, or the Court to which such application has 
been forwarded shall immediately notify the Supreme Court of the 
case and report to it on the progress and results of the steps taken in 
connection therewith. 
Article 21. In regard to the decision made by the lower Court, 
an appeal may be made to the Supreme Court within 3 days. 
Article 22. The Supreme Court, if it finds such steps 
necessary, may cause the Lower Court to transfer the pending case, 
irrespective of the stage of its proceedings and may directly review it. 
The Supreme Court, under the circumstances mentioned in 
the preceding paragraph, may nullify or alter the decision or verdict 
pronounced by the lower court. 
Article 23. The Supreme Court may decide on necessary rules 
governing such application, examination, trial and other matters. 
Article 24. Judgments which were passed according to other 
laws and are unfavourable to the restrained shall be invalied [sic] to 
the extent they conflict with the judgment under this Law. 
Article 25. Those who have been relieved by this Law shall 
not be restrained on the same ground without the judgment of the 
Court. 
Article 26. Anyone who undertakes to remove or hide the 
restrained or contrives his escape, or who commits an act which may 
nullify the relief prescribed by this Law, or who deliberately makes 
incorrect entries in the written answer mentioned in Article 12, 
Paragraph 2, shall be liable to penal servitude of less than 2 years or 
a fine not exceeding ¥ 50,000. 
 
Supplementary Provisions 
This Law shall come into force after the lapse of 60 days from 
the date of its promulgation. 
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XV. APPENDIX 2: HABEAS CORPUS RULES (EXTRACTS)192 
(Purport of this Rule) 
Article 1. The application for relief and the succeeding 
proceedings thereto made under the Habeas Corpus Act . . . shall be 
governed by this Rule, as well as the provisions of the Law. 
 
(Content of the relief) 
Article 2.  The relief under the Law shall be realized by a 
ruling rendered in accordance with provisions of paragraph 2 of 
Article 12 of the Law by the court . . .  commanding the person 
restraining another person to produce the body of the prisoner at a 
certain time and place and submit a written reply by the day of the 
trial, in order to do, submit to and receive the release or other 
dispositions which the court considers suitable in [sic] behalf of the 
prisoner . . . . 
 
(Definition of the restraint and the person restraining another) 
(Requisites of the application) 
Article 4. The application mentioned in Article 2 of the Law 
may be made only if it is obvious and conspicuous that the restrain{t} 
or a judgment order or other disposition relating to the restraint has 
been made without jurisdiction or authority or has been remarkably 
conflicted with formalities or proceedings prescribed in laws, orders 
or rules.  But, in cases where there exists any other adequate means 
whereby relief may be obtained, the abovementioned application may 
not be made unless it is evident that relief cannot be obtained within 
reasonable time [sic]. 
Article 5.  The application mentioned in Article 2 of the Law 
cannot be made against the freely expressed intention of the prisoner. 
 
(Dismissal of application by a ruling) 
Article 21. The court may, by a ruling, dismiss an application 
in the following cases: 
1.  Where an application is illegal and its defects are such that 
it cannot be repaired; 
                                                                                                               
 192 Jinshinhogo Kisoku [Habeas Corpus Rules], Sup. Ct. Rule No. 22 of 1948 (emphasis 
added). 
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2.  Where an applicant [sic] is made against the freely 
expressed intention of the prisoner; 
3.  Where a person restraining another or his residence is 
uncertain; 
4.  Where the prisoner has died; 
5.  Where the prisoner had recovered freedom of his action; 
6.  Where it is evident that there exists no ground justifying 
the application. 
It is not necessary that a ruling under the preceding is notified 
to a person restraining another, except that he has been examined in 
the preliminary inquiry. 
 
(Nature of proceedings of the application) 
Article 46. The proceedings of the application for relief under 
the Law shall be governed, unless contrary to its nature, by the 
provisions governing civil procedure, as well as those of the Law and 
this Rule. 
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